Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a cloud storage service rather than over their primary command and control channel. Cloud storage services such as Dropbox, Google Drive, OneDrive, MEGA, and Amazon S3 allow storage and retrieval of data over the Internet. Exfiltration to these services can blend with legitimate enterprise traffic, providing significant cover. Real-world threat actors including Akira, Leviathan, POLONIUM, LuminousMoth, Mustang Panda, and Kimsuky have all leveraged cloud storage for data theft. Rclone is the most commonly observed tool, used by multiple ransomware and espionage groups to automate bulk transfers to attacker-controlled cloud accounts.
let CloudStorageDomains = dynamic([
"dropbox.com", "dropboxapi.com", "content.dropboxapi.com", "api.dropboxapi.com",
"drive.google.com", "www.googleapis.com", "storage.googleapis.com", "oauth2.googleapis.com",
"graph.microsoft.com", "onedrive.live.com", "api.onedrive.com", "files.1drv.com",
"s3.amazonaws.com", "s3-us-east-1.amazonaws.com",
"mega.io", "mega.nz", "api.mega.co.nz",
"api.box.com", "upload.box.com"
]);
let CloudSyncBinaries = dynamic([
"rclone.exe", "rclone", "azcopy.exe", "azcopy",
"gsutil", "megaput", "megatools", "megacmd"
]);
// Signal 1: Large outbound transfers to known cloud storage endpoints
let LargeUploads = DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (CloudStorageDomains)
| where BytesSent > 10485760
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort,
BytesSent, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessParentFileName, Signal = "LargeCloudUpload";
// Signal 2: Rclone or dedicated cloud sync tools executing
let CloudSyncTools = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName has_any (CloudSyncBinaries)
or ProcessCommandLine has_any (
"rclone copy", "rclone sync", "rclone move", "rclone mount",
"azcopy copy", "azcopy sync",
"gsutil cp", "gsutil rsync",
"aws s3 cp", "aws s3 sync",
":dropbox", ":gdrive", ":onedrive", "mega:", ":s3", ":box"
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessParentFileName, Signal = "CloudSyncTool";
// Signal 3: curl/wget/python uploading to cloud storage APIs
let ApiUploads = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("curl.exe", "curl", "wget.exe", "wget",
"python.exe", "python3", "python3.exe",
"powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (CloudStorageDomains)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (
"-T ", "--upload-file", "-X PUT", "-X POST", "--data-binary",
"-d @", "upload", "put_file", "files_upload", "UploadFile",
"Invoke-RestMethod", "Invoke-WebRequest", "WebClient"
)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessParentFileName, Signal = "CloudApiUpload";
union LargeUploads, CloudSyncTools, ApiUploads
| sort by Timestamp desc Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- OneDrive, Google Drive, and Dropbox desktop sync clients generating large uploads during normal backup or file sync operations
- DevOps pipelines using rclone, azcopy, or gsutil for legitimate CI/CD artifact uploads to cloud storage
- Backup software (Veeam, Acronis, BackBlaze) transferring large volumes to cloud-hosted S3-compatible backends
- Data engineering workflows using gsutil or AWS CLI to transfer datasets between cloud and on-premise environments
- Security tools performing cloud storage integrity checks or automated threat intelligence feeds pulling from S3/GCS
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/002/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1567.002/T1567.002.md
- https://rclone.org/docs/
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/gold-sahara
- https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threat-insight/post/leviathan-espionage-actor-spearphishes-maritime-and-defense-targets
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/06/02/exposing-polonium-activity-and-infrastructure-targeting-israeli-organizations/
- https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/396/Bitdefender-PR-Whitepaper-LuminousMoth-creat5540-en-EN.pdf
- https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/06/15/responding-to-ransomware-rclone-and-the-many-flavors-of-data-exfiltration/
- https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/storage/common/storage-ref-azcopy
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/stately-taurus-targets-myanmar-government/
- https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA21-291A.pdf
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