Response playbooks, investigation guides, and Atomic Red Team tests are Pro-only. Upgrade to unlock the full detection package for THREAT-Impact-VSSShadowCopyDeletion.

Unlock with Pro - from £29/user/mo
THREAT-Impact-VSSShadowCopyDeletion

Inhibit System Recovery — Shadow Copy and Backup Catalog Deletion via vssadmin/wbadmin/wmic

Impact Last updated:

Deleting Volume Shadow Copies and local Windows Server Backup catalogs is one of the most consistent pre-encryption steps observed across ransomware operators, because it removes the victim's fastest and cheapest recovery path before file encryption begins. Attackers who have already escalated privileges typically run one or more of: `vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet` (bulk-deletes all shadow copies on all volumes, silently), `wmic shadowcopy delete` (the WMI equivalent, often used because vssadmin can be blocked by application allowlisting while wmic is overlooked), `wbadmin delete catalog -quiet` or `wbadmin delete systemstatebackup` (removes the local Windows Server Backup catalog and system-state backups so `wbadmin` itself can no longer be used to restore), and `bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no` combined with `bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures` (disables the Windows Recovery Environment and automatic repair so a damaged/encrypted boot volume cannot self-heal). These four commands appear near-verbatim in incident reports for LockBit, Akira, Black Basta, BlackCat/ALPHV, Conti, and Ryuk, frequently chained together in a single batch script or PowerShell one-liner and executed seconds to minutes before the encryptor binary runs. The commands are legitimate, signed Windows administration utilities (LOLBins), so detection must key on the destructive argument combinations (bulk `delete shadows /all`, `shadowcopy delete`, `delete catalog`/`delete systemstatebackup`, `recoveryenabled no`) rather than on the binaries themselves, and correlate bursts of these commands across short windows and/or multiple hosts as the highest-confidence signal of an imminent or in-progress ransomware detonation.

What is THREAT-Impact-VSSShadowCopyDeletion Shadow Copy and Backup Catalog Deletion via vssadmin/wbadmin/wmic?

Shadow Copy and Backup Catalog Deletion via vssadmin/wbadmin/wmic (THREAT-Impact-VSSShadowCopyDeletion) is a sub-technique of Inhibit System Recovery (T1490) in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. It maps to the Impact tactic — the adversary is trying to manipulate, interrupt, or destroy your systems and data.

This page provides production-ready detection logic for Shadow Copy and Backup Catalog Deletion via vssadmin/wbadmin/wmic, covering the data sources and telemetry it touches: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (DeviceProcessEvents), Windows Security Event Log (Event ID 4688 with command-line auditing enabled), Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation). The queries below are rated critical severity at high confidence, and ship for 7 SIEM platforms — KQL, SPL, Elastic, QRadar, Sumo, YARA-L, LogScale.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Impact
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender
kusto
let Lookback = 24h;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(Lookback)
| where (
    (FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete" and ProcessCommandLine has "shadow")
    or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "shadowcopy" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete")
    or (FileName =~ "wbadmin.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "delete" and (ProcessCommandLine has "catalog" or ProcessCommandLine has "systemstatebackup" or ProcessCommandLine has "backup"))
    or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "recoveryenabled" and ProcessCommandLine has "no")
    or (FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "bootstatuspolicy" and ProcessCommandLine has "ignoreallfailures")
    or (FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "Win32_ShadowCopy" and ProcessCommandLine has "Delete")
)
| extend Technique = case(
    FileName =~ "vssadmin.exe", "vssadmin_delete_shadows",
    FileName =~ "wmic.exe", "wmic_shadowcopy_delete",
    FileName =~ "wbadmin.exe", "wbadmin_delete_catalog_or_backup",
    FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "recoveryenabled", "bcdedit_disable_recovery",
    FileName =~ "bcdedit.exe", "bcdedit_ignore_boot_failures",
    "powershell_wmi_shadowcopy_delete"
)
| extend RiskScore = iff(Technique in ("vssadmin_delete_shadows", "wmic_shadowcopy_delete", "wbadmin_delete_catalog_or_backup"), 95, 80)
| summarize Commands = make_set(Technique), Events = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), MaxRisk = max(RiskScore) by DeviceName, AccountName, bin(Timestamp, 30m)
| project FirstSeen, LastSeen, DeviceName, AccountName, Events, Commands, MaxRisk
| sort by MaxRisk desc, LastSeen desc

Detects the four canonical recovery-inhibition commands seen across ransomware pre-encryption playbooks: vssadmin bulk shadow-copy deletion, the wmic shadowcopy equivalent (used to dodge application-allowlisting rules that only cover vssadmin), wbadmin deletion of the local backup catalog or system-state backup, and bcdedit disabling of Windows Recovery Environment auto-repair. Also covers the PowerShell/WMI (Win32_ShadowCopy.Delete()) variant used to avoid spawning vssadmin.exe directly. Groups matches per device/account in 30-minute buckets so a single host running multiple of these commands in quick succession — the typical ransomware batch-script pattern — surfaces as one high-risk event.

critical severity high confidence

Data Sources

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (DeviceProcessEvents) Windows Security Event Log (Event ID 4688 with command-line auditing enabled) Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation)

Required Tables

DeviceProcessEvents

False Positives

  • Scheduled Windows Server Backup maintenance jobs or third-party backup agents (Veeam, Acronis) that legitimately prune old shadow copies or rotate the local backup catalog as part of normal retention policy
  • IT administrators manually running vssadmin to reclaim disk space consumed by shadow copy storage on a volume, especially on file servers with VSS-based previous-versions enabled
  • Golden-image/sysprep build pipelines that call bcdedit to adjust recoveryenabled or bootstatuspolicy settings as part of standard image preparation, not recovery inhibition
  • Disk imaging or cloning tools (e.g. during VM template creation) invoking wmic shadowcopy delete to clear stale shadow copy state before capturing an image
  • Help desk or deployment scripts that reset boot configuration on kiosk/unattended systems, including bootstatuspolicy changes unrelated to malicious intent

Sigma rule & cross-platform mapping

The detection logic for Shadow Copy and Backup Catalog Deletion via vssadmin/wbadmin/wmic (THREAT-Impact-VSSShadowCopyDeletion) above is provided in a vendor-neutral form so you can deploy it on any SIEM. The same logic is shipped here as native KQL (Microsoft Sentinel / Defender), SPL (Splunk), Elastic (Elastic Security (EQL)), QRadar (IBM QRadar (AQL)), Sumo (Sumo Logic CSE), YARA-L (Google Chronicle / SecOps), LogScale (CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL)) queries. In Sigma terms, this detection targets the following logsource:

logsource:
  category: process_creation
  product: windows

Browse the community-maintained Sigma rules for this technique:


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Delete All Volume Shadow Copies via vssadmin

    Expected signal: Sysmon/DeviceProcessEvents/Security 4688 process creation: FileName=vssadmin.exe, CommandLine contains 'delete shadows /all /quiet'.

  2. Test 2Delete Shadow Copies via WMIC

    Expected signal: Sysmon/DeviceProcessEvents/Security 4688 process creation: FileName=wmic.exe, CommandLine contains 'shadowcopy delete'.

  3. Test 3Delete Local Backup Catalog via wbadmin

    Expected signal: Sysmon/DeviceProcessEvents/Security 4688 process creation: FileName=wbadmin.exe, CommandLine contains 'delete catalog -quiet'.

  4. Test 4Disable Windows Recovery Environment via bcdedit

    Expected signal: Sysmon/DeviceProcessEvents/Security 4688 process creation: FileName=bcdedit.exe, two events with CommandLine containing 'recoveryenabled no' and 'bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures' respectively.

Unlock playbooks & atomic tests with Pro

Get the full detection package for THREAT-Impact-VSSShadowCopyDeletion — response playbook and atomic red team tests, plus investigation guidance and hunting queries.

df00tech Pro — £29/user/month

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Related Detections

Tactic Hub

Detection Variants (1)

Different telemetry and tradecraft for the same technique — pick the one that matches the data you collect.