Detect Microsoft Entra ID Session Token Theft and Replay in IBM QRadar
Session token theft (also called token replay or pass-the-cookie) is one of the most prevalent identity attacks targeting Microsoft 365 and Entra ID in 2025-2026. Adversaries use adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) proxy frameworks (Evilginx2, Modlishka, Muraena, Tycoon 2FA, EvilProxy) to intercept valid session cookies from M365 sign-in flows, then replay those cookies to authenticate as the victim without needing their credentials or MFA code. The attack works because Microsoft's authentication cookies are bound to the browser session but not to the originating IP — replaying the cookie from a different IP is detected by Entra ID's risk engine but is not blocked by default. Scattered Spider and Storm-0539 are documented using this technique at scale against SMBs and mid-market organisations, primarily targeting financial fraud (payment diversion, payroll fraud) and IT admin compromise to then facilitate SIM swapping.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access Defense Evasion
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT username, sourceip, "Location" as location, DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') as sign_in_time, LOGSOURCETYPENAME(logsourceid) as log_source FROM events WHERE LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) = 396 AND "properties/status/errorCode" = '0' AND username IS NOT NULL AND username != '' AND sourceip IS NOT NULL LAST 24 HOURSDetects Entra ID session token theft and replay via two indicators: (1) impossible travel — same user authenticating from geographically distinct IPs within 60 minutes; (2) MFA downgrade — successful sign-in with no MFA from a new IP immediately after an MFA-authenticated session. Uses QRadar AQL against Microsoft Azure AD sign-in events.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate VPN or split-tunnel configurations causing IP changes mid-session
- Corporate users roaming between office locations with SSO federated tokens
- Service accounts or automation using cached tokens from build pipelines
- Users travelling domestically between cities that appear geographically distant in IP geolocation databases
- Conditional Access policies exempting certain apps from MFA requirements
Other platforms for THREAT-EntraID-TokenTheft
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 1 adversary technique from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Session Cookie Replay using Evilginx2 Captured Cookie
Expected signal: Azure AD Sign-in logs record a session established from the test IP without MFA, using the replayed cookie. Entra ID Identity Protection may generate an 'Unfamiliar sign-in properties' risk event.
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