Detect Microsoft Entra ID Session Token Theft and Replay in CrowdStrike LogScale
Session token theft (also called token replay or pass-the-cookie) is one of the most prevalent identity attacks targeting Microsoft 365 and Entra ID in 2025-2026. Adversaries use adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) proxy frameworks (Evilginx2, Modlishka, Muraena, Tycoon 2FA, EvilProxy) to intercept valid session cookies from M365 sign-in flows, then replay those cookies to authenticate as the victim without needing their credentials or MFA code. The attack works because Microsoft's authentication cookies are bound to the browser session but not to the originating IP — replaying the cookie from a different IP is detected by Entra ID's risk engine but is not blocked by default. Scattered Spider and Storm-0539 are documented using this technique at scale against SMBs and mid-market organisations, primarily targeting financial fraud (payment diversion, payroll fraud) and IT admin compromise to then facilitate SIM swapping.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access Defense Evasion
LogScale Detection Query
// Entra ID Session Token Theft & Replay — CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale (CQL)
// Requires: Microsoft 365 / Entra ID data ingested via CrowdStrike Falcon for Microsoft 365
#event_simpleName="AzureADSignIn" status.errorCode=0
| eval user=userPrincipalName, ip=ipAddress, loc=location, auth=authenticationDetails
| eval mfa_used=if(match(auth, "(?i)(MFA|Passwordless|FIDO)"), "true", "false")
| sort user, @timestamp
| groupBy([user], function=[
collect([ip, loc, mfa_used, @timestamp], limit=1000)
])
// Flatten and compute sequential pairs
| mvexpand field=ip limit=1000
| rename ip as current_ip
// --- Impossible Travel sub-detection ---
// Join consecutive events per user and flag travel > impossible threshold
#event_simpleName="AzureADSignIn" status.errorCode=0
| eval user=userPrincipalName, ip=ipAddress, loc=location
| eval mfa_used=if(match(authenticationDetails, "(?i)(MFA|Passwordless|FIDO)"), "true", "false")
| sort user, @timestamp
| delta(field=@timestamp, as=time_diff_ms, window=1, partition=user)
| eval time_diff_minutes=time_diff_ms / 60000
| delta(field=ip, as=prev_ip_val, window=1, partition=user)
| delta(field=loc, as=prev_loc_val, window=1, partition=user)
| delta(field=mfa_used, as=prev_mfa_val, window=1, partition=user)
| eval impossible_travel=if(
ip != prev_ip_val
AND loc != prev_loc_val
AND time_diff_minutes > 0
AND time_diff_minutes < 60,
"true", "false"
)
| eval token_replay=if(
mfa_used="false"
AND prev_mfa_val="true"
AND ip != prev_ip_val,
"POSSIBLE_TOKEN_REPLAY", "NORMAL"
)
| where impossible_travel="true" OR token_replay="POSSIBLE_TOKEN_REPLAY"
| eval threat_type=if(impossible_travel="true", "ImpossibleTravel_TokenReplay", "NoMFA_NewIP_TokenReplay")
| eval threat_actors="Scattered Spider, Storm-0539, Midnight Blizzard"
| table(@timestamp, user, ip, loc, prev_ip_val, prev_loc_val, time_diff_minutes, mfa_used, prev_mfa_val, threat_type, threat_actors)
| sort -@timestampCrowdStrike Falcon LogScale CQL query detecting Entra ID session token theft and replay (AiTM). Uses delta() to compute per-user sequential sign-in deltas, then flags impossible travel (two different geo IPs within 60 min) and MFA downgrade (prior MFA session followed by no-MFA sign-in from new IP). Covers Scattered Spider and Storm-0539 TTPs.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- VPN split-tunnel configurations causing IP changes between authenticated API calls
- Legitimate roaming users switching between office, hotel, and mobile hotspot networks
- Conditional Access policies that explicitly exempt compliant devices from step-up MFA
- Federated SSO where upstream IdP handles MFA and Entra ID does not record MFA in auth details
- Automated scripts or service principals authenticating from multiple Azure regions using cached tokens
Other platforms for THREAT-EntraID-TokenTheft
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 1 adversary technique from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Session Cookie Replay using Evilginx2 Captured Cookie
Expected signal: Azure AD Sign-in logs record a session established from the test IP without MFA, using the replayed cookie. Entra ID Identity Protection may generate an 'Unfamiliar sign-in properties' risk event.
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