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THREAT-DiscordWebhook-InfostealerExfil Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Infostealer Credential Exfiltration via Discord Webhook in Google Chronicle

Commodity infostealer malware (RedLine, Raccoon, Vidar, Lumma) and remote access trojans (AsyncRAT) overwhelmingly favor Discord webhooks as a C2-less exfiltration drop for stolen browser credential stores, cookies, cryptocurrency wallet files, and Discord/Telegram session tokens. The webhook URL is hardcoded into the compiled binary, requires no attacker-side listener infrastructure, and the resulting HTTPS traffic to discord.com blends into normal collaboration-tool egress that most enterprises never restrict. Because Discord is rarely blocked and the destination is a legitimate, widely-trusted SaaS domain, this vector routinely bypasses proxy category blocking and simple domain-reputation controls. The most reliable detection opportunity is not the network connection alone (Discord traffic is common) but the temporal pairing of a locked browser credential database being staged/copied by a non-browser process immediately before an outbound POST to a Discord webhook API path from that same process.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Exfiltration

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule discord_webhook_infostealer_exfil {
  meta:
    author = "Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects infostealer credential exfiltration via Discord webhooks (T1567.004)"
    severity = "CRITICAL"
    tactic = "TA0010"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "FILE_CREATION"
    re.regex($e.target.file.full_path, `(?i)(Login Data|Login Data For Account|Cookies|Local State|Web Data|wallet\.dat|keystore\.json)$`)
    not re.regex($e.target.file.full_path, `(?i)User Data`) nocase
    not re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(chrome|msedge|brave|firefox)\.exe$`) nocase

  condition:
    $e
}
critical severity high confidence

Chronicle YARA-L rule detecting the staged-credential-copy signal (a non-browser process creating a file named after a locked browser credential store outside its live profile directory) that precedes Discord webhook exfiltration in commodity infostealer malware.

Data Sources

Network Events via Chronicle UDMFile Events via Chronicle UDM

Required Tables

FILE_CREATION

False Positives & Tuning

  • Authorized forensic or migration tooling staging copies of browser artifact files
  • Password manager sync utilities briefly copying credential store files during import

Other platforms for THREAT-DiscordWebhook-InfostealerExfil


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 2 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate Staged Credential Copy Followed by Discord Webhook POST

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for '...\df00tech-staged\Login Data' outside any '\User Data\' path. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Invoke-RestMethod' and 'webhook.site'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection to webhook.site on port 443.

  2. Test 2Command-Line Discord Webhook Invocation (Script-Based Exfil Simulation)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'discord.com/api/webhooks/'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection attempted to discord.com:443 (fails with 401 due to invalid token, but telemetry is still generated).

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