T1650 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Acquire Access in Google Chronicle

This detection identifies indicators that adversaries have leveraged purchased or brokered access to compromise an environment — the operational signature left when Initial Access Broker (IAB)-sold footholds are activated. Because T1650 itself is a pre-compromise preparation activity, detection focuses on anomalous authentication patterns consistent with a new threat actor using previously established access: first-use logons from novel geolocations for established accounts, high-risk sign-ins immediately followed by reconnaissance activity, web shell process ancestry patterns indicative of broker-planted backdoors, and external remote service sessions from IPs with no prior organizational history. Correlating Azure AD risk signals with unusual lateral movement timing provides the strongest detection fidelity.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Resource Development
Technique
T1650 Acquire Access
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1650/

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule detection_t1650 {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Platform"
    description = "Detects Acquire Access cloud activity - T1650"
    severity = "HIGH"
    mitre_attack = "T1650"
    reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1650/"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "USER_CHANGE"
    $e.principal.user.userid = $user
    $e.principal.ip = $source_ip
    $e.target.resource.name = $resource
    (
      re.regex($e.metadata.product_event_type, `(?i)(add|delete|consent|update|create)`) and
      not re.regex($e.principal.user.userid, `(?i)(service-|automation-|pipeline-)`)
    )

  condition:
    $e
}
high severity medium confidence

Google Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule for detecting Acquire Access (T1650). Uses Chronicle UDM event model to identify acquire access behaviors across endpoint and cloud telemetry.

Data Sources

Azure ADMicrosoft 365

Required Tables

USER_CHANGERESOURCE_CREATION

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate employee travel to a new country using personal or hotel WiFi triggering new geolocation detection
  • Corporate VPN exit node changes or new VPN infrastructure rollout causing unfamiliar IP signals
  • IT administrators using anonymizing proxies or jump hosts for infrastructure management from new regions
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1650


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Simulate IAB Credential Use — New Geolocation Authentication via VPN Exit Node

    Expected signal: AADSignInLogs entry with ResultType=0, RiskLevelDuringSignIn='medium' or 'high', RiskDetail containing 'unfamiliarFeatures' or 'anonymizedIPAddress' if using VPN. Sign-in should appear in Identity Protection risk detections.

  2. Test 2Web Shell Activation Simulation — IIS Spawning Command Shell

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) with ParentImage=w3wp.exe and Image=cmd.exe. DeviceProcessEvents entry showing InitiatingProcessFileName=w3wp.exe and FileName=cmd.exe. Sysmon Event ID 3 (Network Connection) from w3wp.exe to localhost.

  3. Test 3Dormant Account Reactivation Simulation — RDP from New External IP

    Expected signal: Windows Security Event 4624 on target server with Logon Type 10 (RemoteInteractive) or Type 3 (Network), showing the external test IP as the source. Also generates 4776 (credential validation) and 4672 (special privileges) if test account has elevated rights.

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Get the full detection package for T1650 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

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