Acquire Access
This detection identifies indicators that adversaries have leveraged purchased or brokered access to compromise an environment — the operational signature left when Initial Access Broker (IAB)-sold footholds are activated. Because T1650 itself is a pre-compromise preparation activity, detection focuses on anomalous authentication patterns consistent with a new threat actor using previously established access: first-use logons from novel geolocations for established accounts, high-risk sign-ins immediately followed by reconnaissance activity, web shell process ancestry patterns indicative of broker-planted backdoors, and external remote service sessions from IPs with no prior organizational history. Correlating Azure AD risk signals with unusual lateral movement timing provides the strongest detection fidelity.
// T1650 — Acquire Access: Detect activated IAB-sold footholds via anomalous first-use authentication
let lookbackDays = 30d;
let alertWindowHours = 24h;
// Build baseline of known IPs and locations per user over past 30 days
let historicalBaseline = AADSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated between (ago(lookbackDays) .. ago(alertWindowHours))
| where ResultType == 0
| summarize
HistoricalIPs = make_set(IPAddress, 500),
HistoricalCountries = make_set(Location, 100),
AccountAgeInDays = count()
by UserPrincipalName;
// Identify recent high-risk or anomalous successful sign-ins
let recentHighRiskSignins = AADSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(alertWindowHours)
| where ResultType == 0
| where RiskLevelDuringSignIn in ("high", "medium")
or RiskState in ("atRisk", "confirmedCompromised")
or RiskDetail has_any ("unfamiliarFeatures", "anonymizedIPAddress", "maliciousIPAddress", "impossibleTravel", "newCountry")
| project
TimeGenerated,
UserPrincipalName,
IPAddress,
Location,
AppDisplayName,
DeviceDetail = tostring(DeviceDetail),
RiskLevelDuringSignIn,
RiskState,
RiskDetail = tostring(RiskDetail),
AuthenticationRequirement,
ConditionalAccessStatus,
CorrelationId;
// Join to baseline — flag new-country/new-IP access for established accounts
recentHighRiskSignins
| join kind=leftouter historicalBaseline on UserPrincipalName
| where AccountAgeInDays > 7 // Established account, not brand new
| where not(IPAddress in (HistoricalIPs))
| where not(Location in (HistoricalCountries))
| extend
RiskScore = case(
RiskLevelDuringSignIn == "high", 3,
RiskLevelDuringSignIn == "medium", 2,
1
),
NewGeolocation = strcat("New country/IP for this account: ", Location, " / ", IPAddress),
BrokerIndicators = case(
RiskDetail has "anonymizedIPAddress", "TOR/VPN exit node — common IAB delivery mechanism",
RiskDetail has "maliciousIPAddress", "Known malicious IP — potential broker infrastructure",
RiskDetail has "impossibleTravel", "Impossible travel — credential handoff to remote threat actor",
RiskDetail has "newCountry", "New country logon — new actor using acquired creds",
"High-risk sign-in from unknown location"
)
| where RiskScore >= 2
| project
TimeGenerated,
UserPrincipalName,
IPAddress,
Location,
AppDisplayName,
RiskLevelDuringSignIn,
RiskState,
BrokerIndicators,
NewGeolocation,
ConditionalAccessStatus,
CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives
- Legitimate employee travel to a new country using personal or hotel WiFi triggering new geolocation detection
- Corporate VPN exit node changes or new VPN infrastructure rollout causing unfamiliar IP signals
- IT administrators using anonymizing proxies or jump hosts for infrastructure management from new regions
- New employee first logon from home network or coworking space not in organizational baseline
- Mergers/acquisitions onboarding new users from previously unseen IP ranges
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1650/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/access-brokers-who-are-they-and-how-do-they-operate/
- https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/06/arrests-tied-to-cybercrime-forums-romanticized-on-underground-boards/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-152a
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/medusa-ransomware-threat-group/
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