Detect Gather Victim Network Information in IBM QRadar
This detection identifies adversary reconnaissance activity targeting victim network information, including IP ranges, domain names, DNS records, network topology, and security appliance configurations. Because T1590 is a PRE-ATT&CK technique, direct detection within the victim environment is limited; however, second-order indicators are observable when adversaries deploy internal network enumeration tools post-compromise (as seen with Volt Typhoon, Indrik Spider, and HAFNIUM), attempt DNS zone transfers, execute WHOIS or DNS enumeration utilities, or run network discovery tools such as Lansweeper and Advanced IP Scanner. Detection focuses on process execution of known network reconnaissance binaries, DNS zone transfer attempts, and anomalous internal network topology queries that suggest an adversary mapping the environment for lateral movement or targeting.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Reconnaissance
- Technique
- T1590 Gather Victim Network Information
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS EventTime,
sourceip AS SourceIP,
username AS Username,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS LogSource,
QIDNAME(qid) AS EventName,
"Process Name" AS ProcessName,
"Command" AS CommandLine,
"Parent Process Name" AS ParentProcess,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*nmap.*|.*masscan.*|.*zmap.*|.*fping.*|.*nbtscan.*|.*unicornscan.*' THEN 'PortHostScanning'
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*dnsrecon.*|.*dnsenum.*|.*fierce.*|.*axfr.*|.*zone.transfer.*|.*zone-transfer.*' THEN 'DNSEnumeration'
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*lansweeper.*|.*advanced.port.scanner.*|.*angryip.*|.*netdiscover.*|.*advanced_port_scanner.*' THEN 'NetworkDiscoveryTool'
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*/dclist.*|.*/domain_trusts.*|.*/trusted_domains.*|.*/dsgetdc.*' THEN 'DomainTrustEnumeration'
ELSE 'KnownReconBinary'
END AS ReconCategory,
CASE
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*nmap.*|.*masscan.*|.*zmap.*|.*fping.*|.*nbtscan.*|.*unicornscan.*' THEN 90
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*dnsrecon.*|.*dnsenum.*|.*fierce.*|.*axfr.*|.*zone.transfer.*' THEN 85
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*lansweeper.*|.*advanced.port.scanner.*|.*angryip.*|.*netdiscover.*' THEN 80
WHEN LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*/dclist.*|.*/domain_trusts.*|.*/trusted_domains.*|.*/dsgetdc.*' THEN 70
ELSE 75
END AS SuspicionScore
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPENAME(devicetype) IN ('Microsoft Windows Security Event Log', 'Microsoft Sysmon', 'Linux OS')
AND (
LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*nmap.*|.*masscan.*|.*zmap.*|.*fping.*|.*nbtscan.*|.*unicornscan.*|.*dnsenum.*|.*dnsrecon.*|.*fierce.*|.*lansweeper.*|.*netdiscover.*|.*amass.*|.*sublist3r.*|.*theharvester.*|.*angryip.*'
OR LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*axfr.*|.*zone.transfer.*|.*zone-transfer.*|.*/dclist.*|.*/domain_trusts.*|.*/dsgetdc.*|.*/trusted_domains.*|.*-t any.*'
OR (
LOWER("Process Name") MATCHES '.*nltest.*'
AND LOWER("Command") MATCHES '.*/dclist.*|.*/domain_trusts.*|.*/trusted_domains.*|.*/dsgetdc.*'
)
)
AND starttime > NOW() - 86400000
ORDER BY SuspicionScore DESC, starttime DESCDetects execution of known network reconnaissance utilities and DNS zone transfer attempts consistent with T1590. Queries process creation events from Windows Security Event Log and Sysmon sources, categorising findings into port/host scanning, DNS enumeration, network discovery tool usage, and domain trust enumeration. Suspicion scoring mirrors the KQL/SPL baseline for consistent cross-platform triage.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized penetration testing or red team engagements — correlate with scheduled maintenance windows and source IP allowlists in QRadar reference sets
- IT asset inventory tools such as Lansweeper or PDQ Inventory running under service accounts on scheduled scan intervals
- Network administrators executing nltest commands for routine Active Directory health checks, domain controller discovery, or trust relationship validation
- Vulnerability management infrastructure where nmap is invoked as a subprocess by scanning platforms (Tenable, Qualys, Rapid7)
- DNS administrators running dig with AXFR for zone replication health verification between authoritative servers
Other platforms for T1590
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Nmap Internal Subnet Port Scan
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode 1 (process create) with Image=nmap.exe, CommandLine containing the subnet range. Sysmon EventCode 3 (network connect) showing connections from nmap.exe to multiple internal IPs on specified ports. DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceNetworkEvents telemetry in MDE.
- Test 2DNS Zone Transfer Attempt via nslookup
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode 1 with Image=nslookup.exe, CommandLine containing 'AXFR' and the target domain. Windows DNS debug log (if enabled) will show an AXFR request from the client IP. DeviceProcessEvents in MDE captures the command line.
- Test 3Domain Trust Enumeration via nltest
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode 1 (process create) for each nltest invocation with the respective flags in CommandLine. SecurityEvent EventID 4688 if process command line auditing is enabled via GPO. DeviceProcessEvents in MDE with full command line captured.
- Test 4Internal Network Discovery with Advanced IP Scanner
Expected signal: DeviceFileEvents showing advanced_ip_scanner.exe created in C:\Temp. Sysmon EventCode 11 (file create) for the binary. Process creation event for advanced_ip_scanner.exe. Network connection events to multiple internal IPs during scan. DeviceNetworkEvents in MDE showing mass internal connections.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/indrik-spider
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