Detect Gather Victim Network Information in Elastic Security
This detection identifies adversary reconnaissance activity targeting victim network information, including IP ranges, domain names, DNS records, network topology, and security appliance configurations. Because T1590 is a PRE-ATT&CK technique, direct detection within the victim environment is limited; however, second-order indicators are observable when adversaries deploy internal network enumeration tools post-compromise (as seen with Volt Typhoon, Indrik Spider, and HAFNIUM), attempt DNS zone transfers, execute WHOIS or DNS enumeration utilities, or run network discovery tools such as Lansweeper and Advanced IP Scanner. Detection focuses on process execution of known network reconnaissance binaries, DNS zone transfer attempts, and anomalous internal network topology queries that suggest an adversary mapping the environment for lateral movement or targeting.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Reconnaissance
- Technique
- T1590 Gather Victim Network Information
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/
Elastic Detection Query
process where event.type == "start" and (
process.name : ("nmap", "nmap.exe", "masscan", "masscan.exe", "zmap", "zmap.exe", "fping", "fping.exe", "nbtscan", "nbtscan.exe", "unicornscan", "dnsenum", "dnsenum.py", "dnsrecon", "dnsrecon.py", "fierce", "fierce.py", "sublist3r", "amass", "theharvester", "lansweeper", "lansweeper.exe", "netdiscover", "angryip", "advanced_port_scanner.exe") or
process.args : ("axfr", "AXFR", "zone-transfer", "-t ANY", "ls -d") or
(
process.name : ("nltest.exe") and
process.args : ("/dclist*", "/domain_trusts", "/trusted_domains", "/dsgetdc")
) or
(
process.name : ("nslookup.exe", "dig", "dig.exe", "host", "host.exe") and
process.args : ("axfr", "AXFR", "zone-transfer", "ANY")
)
)Detects adversary network reconnaissance activity consistent with T1590 — Gather Victim Network Information. Identifies execution of known network discovery tools (nmap, masscan, zmap, lansweeper, Advanced IP Scanner), DNS zone transfer attempts via nslookup/dig with AXFR requests, and domain trust enumeration via nltest. Covers post-compromise internal enumeration patterns observed in Volt Typhoon, HAFNIUM, and Indrik Spider intrusions.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized red team or penetration testing engagements using nmap, masscan, or dnsrecon against internal ranges — correlate with change ticket or pentest window
- Network operations teams running Lansweeper or Advanced IP Scanner for legitimate asset inventory and network documentation purposes
- Security operations or IT engineers running nltest for Active Directory troubleshooting, domain trust validation, or DC discovery in large enterprise environments
- Vulnerability management scanners (Tenable Nessus, Qualys) invoking nmap as a subprocess during authenticated scan pipelines
- DNS administrators performing authorized zone transfer tests or AXFR validation between primary and secondary authoritative name servers
Other platforms for T1590
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Nmap Internal Subnet Port Scan
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode 1 (process create) with Image=nmap.exe, CommandLine containing the subnet range. Sysmon EventCode 3 (network connect) showing connections from nmap.exe to multiple internal IPs on specified ports. DeviceProcessEvents and DeviceNetworkEvents telemetry in MDE.
- Test 2DNS Zone Transfer Attempt via nslookup
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode 1 with Image=nslookup.exe, CommandLine containing 'AXFR' and the target domain. Windows DNS debug log (if enabled) will show an AXFR request from the client IP. DeviceProcessEvents in MDE captures the command line.
- Test 3Domain Trust Enumeration via nltest
Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode 1 (process create) for each nltest invocation with the respective flags in CommandLine. SecurityEvent EventID 4688 if process command line auditing is enabled via GPO. DeviceProcessEvents in MDE with full command line captured.
- Test 4Internal Network Discovery with Advanced IP Scanner
Expected signal: DeviceFileEvents showing advanced_ip_scanner.exe created in C:\Temp. Sysmon EventCode 11 (file create) for the binary. Process creation event for advanced_ip_scanner.exe. Network connection events to multiple internal IPs during scan. DeviceNetworkEvents in MDE showing mass internal connections.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1590/
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2023/05/24/volt-typhoon-targets-us-critical-infrastructure-with-living-off-the-land-techniques/
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/indrik-spider
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