Detect Services Registry Permissions Weakness in Splunk
Adversaries may redirect service execution by exploiting weak permissions on service registry keys under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. Unlike modifying the binary, this approach modifies the registry value (ImagePath or BinPath) to point to a malicious executable. Additionally, the FailureCommand key can trigger malicious execution when a service fails, and the Performance DLL key can be used for DLL injection. The WinSock2\Parameters\AutodialDLL vector allows persistence via a DLL loaded every time the Winsock2 library is invoked. Vulnerability in RpcEptMapper service allowed non-admin users to create a Performance subkey, loading a DLL in any process using the RPC endpoint mapper.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- Sub-technique
- T1574.011 Services Registry Permissions Weakness
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/
SPL Detection Query
index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=13
| where match(TargetObject, "HKLM\\\\SYSTEM\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services")
| where match(TargetObject, "(ImagePath|BinPath|FailureCommand|ObjectName|Performance|Parameters)")
| where NOT (Image like "%msiexec.exe" OR Image like "%services.exe" OR Image like "%svchost.exe" OR Image like "%TrustedInstaller.exe")
| where User!="NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM" AND User!=""
| eval ServiceName=mvindex(split(TargetObject, "\\"), 6)
| eval IsCriticalValue=if(match(TargetObject, "(ImagePath|BinPath|FailureCommand)"), "YES", "NO")
| table _time, host, User, ServiceName, TargetObject, Details, Image, IsCriticalValue
| sort - _timeDetects service registry key modifications by non-SYSTEM, non-trusted processes using Sysmon EventCode 13 (Registry Value Set). Identifies the specific service name from the registry path and flags modifications to critical execution values (ImagePath, FailureCommand) versus configuration values (Parameters, Performance DLL). Critical value modifications warrant immediate investigation.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- sc.exe commands run by legitimate administrators to reconfigure service startup types or accounts
- Software installers modifying their own service configurations
- Remote management tools that update service parameters
- Monitoring agents that modify their own service entries
Other platforms for T1574.011
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Modify Service ImagePath via Registry (Non-Admin Demonstration)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 (Registry Value Set) if the modification succeeds. reg.exe process creation events. If access is denied (correct behavior), only the query event fires. Security Event ID 4663 if registry auditing is enabled.
- Test 2Set Malicious FailureCommand on Test Service
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: FailureCommand registry value set under Services\FailureCmdTest\Parameters. Security Event ID 7045 (service installed). Process creation events for sc.exe. The FailureCommand would execute when sc stop FailureCmdTest is called and the service fails to stop cleanly.
- Test 3Check WinSock2 AutodialDLL Registry Value
Expected signal: reg.exe process creation. Registry read operation on WinSock2\Parameters. If the value were set (not in this test), every process using Winsock2 would load the specified DLL.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/
- https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/autodialdlling-your-way/
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md
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