Detect Services Registry Permissions Weakness in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may redirect service execution by exploiting weak permissions on service registry keys under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services. Unlike modifying the binary, this approach modifies the registry value (ImagePath or BinPath) to point to a malicious executable. Additionally, the FailureCommand key can trigger malicious execution when a service fails, and the Performance DLL key can be used for DLL injection. The WinSock2\Parameters\AutodialDLL vector allows persistence via a DLL loaded every time the Winsock2 library is invoked. Vulnerability in RpcEptMapper service allowed non-admin users to create a Performance subkey, loading a DLL in any process using the RPC endpoint mapper.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
- Sub-technique
- T1574.011 Services Registry Permissions Weakness
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule T1574_011_hijack_execution {
meta:
author = "Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects execution flow hijacking via installer or DLL path manipulation"
severity = "high"
confidence = "high"
mitre_attack = "T1574.011"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
(
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)\\temp\\.*\.exe`) or
re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)\\appdata\\.*\.exe`)
)
not re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(msiexec|trustedinstaller|wusa|dpinst)`)
not $e.principal.user.user_display_name = "SYSTEM"
condition:
$e
}Google Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 detection for Services Registry Permissions Weakness. Detects non-privileged modifications to service registry keys under HKLM\CurrentControlSet\Services. Focuses on critical value names: ImagePath (execution path), FailureCommand (executed on service fa
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate multi-stage installer processes that modify binaries during installation phases
- Enterprise software deployment tools staging installer components in temp directories
- Self-updating applications that download and replace their own binaries
- Archive utilities that extract executables to temp before running them
Other platforms for T1574.011
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Modify Service ImagePath via Registry (Non-Admin Demonstration)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 (Registry Value Set) if the modification succeeds. reg.exe process creation events. If access is denied (correct behavior), only the query event fires. Security Event ID 4663 if registry auditing is enabled.
- Test 2Set Malicious FailureCommand on Test Service
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: FailureCommand registry value set under Services\FailureCmdTest\Parameters. Security Event ID 7045 (service installed). Process creation events for sc.exe. The FailureCommand would execute when sc stop FailureCmdTest is called and the service fails to stop cleanly.
- Test 3Check WinSock2 AutodialDLL Registry Value
Expected signal: reg.exe process creation. Registry read operation on WinSock2\Parameters. If the value were set (not in this test), every process using Winsock2 would load the specified DLL.
References (6)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/011/
- https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/
- https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/autodialdlling-your-way/
- https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md
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