T1567.004 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Exfiltration Over Webhook in Elastic Security

Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple HTTP/S push mechanisms supported by collaboration platforms such as Discord, Slack, Microsoft Teams, and generic services like webhook.site. Adversaries exploit these endpoints by either linking an adversary-controlled webhook to a victim-owned SaaS service for automated repeated exfiltration of emails or chat messages, or by manually posting staged data directly to a webhook URL via scripting tools. Because webhook traffic is HTTPS and destined for widely-trusted SaaS domains, it blends with normal enterprise traffic and often bypasses data loss prevention controls. Observed real-world usage includes Discord webhooks for credential and token exfiltration from malicious npm packages, Slack webhooks used by insider threats, and Microsoft Teams webhooks abused via SQL Server xp_cmdshell lateral movement chains.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Exfiltration
Technique
T1567 Exfiltration Over Web Service
Sub-technique
T1567.004 Exfiltration Over Webhook
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/004/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
sequence by host.id, user.name with maxspan=10m
  [network where event.type == "connection" and
   (
     dns.question.name : ("discord.com", "discordapp.com", "hooks.slack.com", "slack.com", "webhook.site", "webhooks.site", "outlook.office.com", "outlook.office365.com", "pipedream.net", "requestbin.com", "requestcatcher.com", "hookbin.com", "beeceptor.com", "smee.io", "ntfy.sh", "pushover.net") or
     url.domain : ("discord.com", "discordapp.com", "hooks.slack.com", "webhook.site", "pipedream.net", "ntfy.sh") or
     url.path : ("/api/webhooks/*", "/services/T*")
   ) and
   process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "cmd.exe", "python.exe", "python3", "node.exe", "curl.exe", "wget.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "bitsadmin.exe", "certutil.exe")]
  [network where event.type == "connection" and
   (
     dns.question.name : ("discord.com", "discordapp.com", "hooks.slack.com", "slack.com", "webhook.site", "webhooks.site", "outlook.office.com", "outlook.office365.com", "pipedream.net", "requestbin.com", "requestcatcher.com", "hookbin.com", "beeceptor.com", "smee.io", "ntfy.sh", "pushover.net") or
     url.domain : ("discord.com", "discordapp.com", "hooks.slack.com", "webhook.site", "pipedream.net", "ntfy.sh")
   ) and network.bytes > 1048576]

/* Standalone rule for webhook URL patterns in process args */
/* any where event.category == "process" and event.type == "start" and
   process.command_line : ("*discord.com/api/webhooks*", "*hooks.slack.com/services*", "*webhook.site*", "*outlook.office.com/webhook*", "*outlook.office365.com/webhook*", "*pipedream.net*", "*requestbin.com*", "*hookbin.com*", "*beeceptor.com*", "*ntfy.sh*", "*smee.io*") */
high severity medium confidence

Detects exfiltration over webhook endpoints by correlating suspicious process network connections to known webhook domains with large outbound transfers. A sequence match identifies a suspicious process (PowerShell, curl, Python, etc.) that connects to a webhook domain and then sends more than 1MB of data. A standalone process event rule (commented inline) also catches webhook URLs embedded directly in command-line arguments, covering staged manual POST exfiltration.

Data Sources

Elastic Endpoint SecurityElastic Agent network eventsPacketbeatAuditbeat

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.network-*logs-endpoint.events.process-*packetbeat-*

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate DevOps pipelines using curl or Python scripts to post build notifications or alerts to Slack or Teams webhooks as part of CI/CD workflows.
  • Security tools and monitoring scripts (e.g., Ansible, Terraform) that post status updates to webhook endpoints as part of infrastructure automation.
  • Developer workstations running Node.js or Python applications that legitimately integrate with Discord or Slack bots for chat notifications.
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1567.004


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Exfiltrate Data via Discord Webhook using PowerShell

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Invoke-RestMethod' and 'webhook.site'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection from powershell.exe to webhook.site on port 443. DeviceNetworkEvents: RemoteUrl containing webhook.site, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe, BytesSent > 0.

  2. Test 2Exfiltrate File Contents via curl to Webhook Endpoint

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for cmd.exe (echo/type) and curl.exe with CommandLine containing 'webhook.site' and '-X POST'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for the staging file in %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection from curl.exe to webhook.site on port 443. DeviceNetworkEvents: InitiatingProcessFileName=curl.exe, RemoteUrl containing webhook.site.

  3. Test 3Python Requests Library Webhook Exfiltration

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=python.exe, CommandLine containing 'urllib.request', 'webhook.site', and 'POST'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection from python.exe to webhook.site on port 443. DeviceNetworkEvents: InitiatingProcessFileName=python.exe, RemoteUrl=webhook.site.

  4. Test 4Automated SaaS Webhook Exfiltration via Microsoft Teams Incoming Webhook

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Invoke-WebRequest' and 'outlook.office.com/webhook'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection from powershell.exe to outlook.office.com on port 443. DeviceNetworkEvents: RemoteUrl containing /webhook/, InitiatingProcessFileName=powershell.exe.

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