Detect Spearphishing Attachment in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries send targeted spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to gain initial access. Attachments may include Microsoft Office documents with macros, PDFs exploiting reader vulnerabilities, executables disguised with document icons, archive files (ZIP, ISO, IMG) containing LNK or script files, or RTF files exploiting equation editor vulnerabilities. Upon opening the attachment, the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or executes directly, typically spawning a child process from the email client or document handler. Common threat actors using this technique include APT28, Lazarus Group, FIN6, Cobalt Group, and Tropic Trooper.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Initial Access
- Technique
- T1566 Phishing
- Sub-technique
- T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" EventCode=1
| where ParentImage matches /(?i)\\(winword|excel|powerpnt|outlook|mspub|msaccess|onenote|visio|eqnedt32)\.exe$/
| where Image matches /(?i)\\(cmd|powershell|pwsh|wscript|cscript|mshta|regsvr32|rundll32|certutil|bitsadmin|curl|wget|msbuild|installutil|schtasks|at|wmic|odbcconf|pcalua|cmstp|msiexec|explorer|hh)\.exe$/
| parse field=Image "*\\*" as _dir, ChildProcess
| parse field=ParentImage "*\\*" as _pdir, ParentProcess
| if (ChildProcess matches /(?i)(powershell|pwsh|mshta|wscript|cscript)\.exe/, "Critical",
if (ChildProcess matches /(?i)(certutil|bitsadmin|regsvr32|rundll32|odbcconf|cmstp)\.exe/, "High", "Medium")) as RiskLevel
| if (CommandLine matches /(?i)(https?:\/\/|ftp:\/\/|\\\\\\\\)/, 1, 0) as HasNetworkRef
| if (CommandLine matches /(?i)(-enc|-encodedcommand|frombase64string|\/e:jscript|\/e:vbscript)/, 1, 0) as HasEncodedPayload
| if (CommandLine matches /(?i)(\\temp\\|\\appdata\\|\\downloads\\|%temp%|%appdata%)/, 1, 0) as TempExecution
| fields _messageTime, ComputerName, User, ChildProcess, CommandLine, ParentProcess, ParentCommandLine, RiskLevel, HasNetworkRef, HasEncodedPayload, TempExecution
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic CSE query detecting spearphishing attachment execution by identifying Sysmon Process Create events (EventCode 1) where an Office application parent spawns a LOLBin or script interpreter child process. Enrichment fields classify risk level, detect network references in command lines (potential C2 beaconing), encoded payloads (obfuscation), and execution from temp/user-writable paths.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Business intelligence tools like Power BI embedded in Excel that call PowerShell cmdlets to refresh data from internal APIs or SharePoint.
- Legal or HR teams using macro-enabled Word templates that spawn cmd.exe to print or convert documents via command-line utilities.
- Software vendors whose Office add-ins use msiexec.exe or rundll32.exe for silent update routines triggered when documents are opened.
Other platforms for T1566.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Word Macro Spawning PowerShell (VBA Simulation)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe. If run from within a Word VBA macro (Tools > Macro > Run), the ParentImage will be winword.exe. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) will capture the full command line.
- Test 2LNK File Execution Simulating ISO-Delivered Spearphishing
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Created for InvoiceDocument.lnk in %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=cmd.exe, ParentImage=explorer.exe (or the process that invoked Start-Process). The LNK file path in temp directory is a key indicator. Sysmon Event ID 1 will show target command line '/c whoami'.
- Test 3Excel Macro Dropping Script to Disk (Dropper Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: File Created for update_helper.ps1 in %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing '-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File' and the temp path. DeviceFileEvents ActionType=FileCreated for the .ps1 file. The combination of file drop to temp + immediate execution is a high-fidelity pattern.
- Test 4Equation Editor Exploitation Simulation (CVE-2017-11882 Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=cmd.exe. In real exploitation, ParentImage=eqnedt32.exe (C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\OfficeSoftwareProtectionPlatform\OSPPSVC.EXE launching eqnedt32.exe which spawns cmd.exe). Security Event ID 4688 with cmd.exe command line. For authentic testing, embed this command in an RTF file using a hex editor to trigger via eqnedt32.exe.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/09/15/analyzing-attacks-that-exploit-the-mshtml-cve-2021-40444-vulnerability/
- https://research.checkpoint.com/2021/irans-apt34-returns-with-an-updated-arsenal/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-threat-actor-group-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-government/
- https://www.secureworks.com/blog/darktortilla-malware-analysis
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/office-365-security/anti-spoofing-protection
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-emailattachmentinfo-table
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/embracing-offensive-tooling-building-detections-against-koadic-using-eql
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_office_spawn_susp_process.yml
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