T1555.004 Splunk · SPL

Detect Windows Credential Manager in Splunk

Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults). Credentials are stored as encrypted .vcrd files under %Systemdrive%\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\[Vault/Credentials]\. Adversaries may enumerate credentials via vaultcmd.exe, cmdkey.exe, Windows APIs (CredEnumerateA), or extract credential backups via rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr. Tools like Mimikatz (vault::cred, vault::list) and PowerSploit can also harvest Credential Manager contents.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Credential Access
Technique
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Sub-technique
T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/

SPL Detection Query

Splunk (SPL)
spl
index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
  ((Image="*\\vaultcmd.exe" AND (CommandLine="*/listcreds*" OR CommandLine="*/list*"))
  OR (Image="*\\cmdkey.exe" AND CommandLine="*/list*")
  OR (Image="*\\rundll32.exe" AND CommandLine="*keymgr.dll*")
  OR CommandLine="*Invoke-WCMDump*"
  OR CommandLine="*vault::cred*"
  OR CommandLine="*vault::list*"
  OR CommandLine="*dpapi::cred*"
  OR CommandLine="*Get-VaultCredential*"
  OR CommandLine="*CredEnumerateA*"
  OR CommandLine="*CredEnumerateW*")
| eval VaultEnum=if(match(Image, "(?i)vaultcmd") OR match(CommandLine, "vault::list"), 1, 0)
| eval CmdkeyEnum=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)cmdkey.*/list"), 1, 0)
| eval MimikatzVault=if(match(CommandLine, "(vault::cred|dpapi::cred)"), 1, 0)
| eval CredBackup=if(match(CommandLine, "(?i)keymgr\.dll"), 1, 0)
| eval SuspicionScore=VaultEnum + CmdkeyEnum + MimikatzVault*3 + CredBackup*2
| where SuspicionScore > 0
| table _time, host, User, Image, CommandLine, ParentImage, ParentCommandLine, VaultEnum, CmdkeyEnum, MimikatzVault, CredBackup, SuspicionScore
| sort - _time
high severity high confidence

Detects Windows Credential Manager credential harvesting via Sysmon process creation events. Identifies native utilities (vaultcmd, cmdkey), Mimikatz vault/dpapi modules (weighted highest), credential backup via keymgr.dll, and PowerShell-based credential dumpers. Scoring prioritizes known offensive tool patterns over native utility usage.

Data Sources

Process: Process CreationCommand: Command ExecutionSysmon Event ID 1

Required Sourcetypes

XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational

False Positives & Tuning

  • System administrators using cmdkey /list to audit stored credentials
  • IT helpdesk scripts checking credential store status
  • Endpoint management tools enumerating credentials for compliance
  • Windows system processes during normal authentication
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1555.004


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Enumerate stored credentials with cmdkey

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=cmdkey.exe, CommandLine='cmdkey /list'. Security Event ID 4688 with same details. Security Event ID 5379 if Credential Validation auditing is enabled.

  2. Test 2Enumerate vault credentials with vaultcmd

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=vaultcmd.exe, CommandLine containing '/listcreds'. Security Event ID 4688 with command line.

  3. Test 3Export credential backup via keymgr.dll

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=rundll32.exe, CommandLine='rundll32.exe keymgr.dll,KRShowKeyMgr'. The GUI will open for user interaction.

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