T1555.004 CrowdStrike LogScale · LogScale

Detect Windows Credential Manager in CrowdStrike LogScale

Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults). Credentials are stored as encrypted .vcrd files under %Systemdrive%\Users\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\[Vault/Credentials]\. Adversaries may enumerate credentials via vaultcmd.exe, cmdkey.exe, Windows APIs (CredEnumerateA), or extract credential backups via rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr. Tools like Mimikatz (vault::cred, vault::list) and PowerSploit can also harvest Credential Manager contents.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Credential Access
Technique
T1555 Credentials from Password Stores
Sub-technique
T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/004/

LogScale Detection Query

CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale)
cql
#event_simpleName = ProcessRollup2
| CommandLine = /(?i)(vaultcmd.*(\/listcreds|\/list)|cmdkey.*\/list|rundll32.*keymgr[.]dll|Invoke-WCMDump|vault::cred|vault::list|dpapi::cred|Get-VaultCredential|CredEnumerateA|CredEnumerateW|KRShowKeyMgr)/
| VaultEnum := if(CommandLine = /(?i)(vaultcmd|vault::list)/, 1, 0)
| CmdkeyEnum := if(CommandLine = /(?i)cmdkey.*\/list/, 1, 0)
| MimikatzVault := if(CommandLine = /(?i)(vault::cred|dpapi::cred)/, 1, 0)
| CredBackup := if(CommandLine = /(?i)keymgr[.]dll/, 1, 0)
| SuspicionScore := VaultEnum + CmdkeyEnum + (MimikatzVault * 3) + (CredBackup * 2)
| select([timestamp, ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, VaultEnum, CmdkeyEnum, MimikatzVault, CredBackup, SuspicionScore])
| sort(timestamp, order=desc)
high severity high confidence

Detects Windows Credential Manager access in CrowdStrike Falcon LogScale using ProcessRollup2 events. Applies regex-based behavioral classification against CommandLine and ImageFileName to identify vaultcmd enumeration, cmdkey /list abuse, rundll32 loading keymgr.dll for credential backup, and Mimikatz vault/dpapi module execution. Computes a suspicion score identical to the SPL query for consistent triage prioritisation across platforms. Mimikatz detections weighted 3x and credential backup 2x to surface higher-confidence indicators first.

Data Sources

CrowdStrike Falcon Endpoint AgentFalcon ProcessRollup2 Event Stream

Required Tables

ProcessRollup2 (Falcon event stream)

False Positives & Tuning

  • Help desk automation workflows using cmdkey to configure persistent credentials for unattended RDP or file share access on managed endpoints
  • CrowdStrike Falcon itself or third-party EDR agents that enumerate Windows Credential Manager entries during endpoint posture assessment or credential hygiene checks
  • Developer workstations running integration test suites or CI pipeline scripts that invoke Windows credential management APIs for authentication testing against internal services
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1555.004


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Enumerate stored credentials with cmdkey

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=cmdkey.exe, CommandLine='cmdkey /list'. Security Event ID 4688 with same details. Security Event ID 5379 if Credential Validation auditing is enabled.

  2. Test 2Enumerate vault credentials with vaultcmd

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=vaultcmd.exe, CommandLine containing '/listcreds'. Security Event ID 4688 with command line.

  3. Test 3Export credential backup via keymgr.dll

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=rundll32.exe, CommandLine='rundll32.exe keymgr.dll,KRShowKeyMgr'. The GUI will open for user interaction.

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