Detect Pass the Ticket in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may 'pass the ticket' using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls and credential requirements. Pass the Ticket (PtT) involves injecting a valid Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) or service ticket into a current Windows logon session, allowing authentication to resources as the ticket's owner without knowing the account password. Tickets are typically obtained via OS credential dumping against LSASS memory (using tools like Mimikatz sekurlsa::tickets or Rubeus dump) and then injected with Mimikatz kerberos::ptt or Rubeus ptt. A Silver Ticket attack forges a service ticket using a compromised service account's NTLM hash, granting access to that specific service. A Golden Ticket forges a TGT using the krbtgt account hash, effectively granting domain-wide persistence. 'Overpass the Hash' uses an NTLM hash to request a legitimate Kerberos TGT, bridging Pass the Hash and Pass the Ticket. Real-world users of this technique include APT29 (Kerberos ticket attacks during Nobelium campaigns), APT32 (Cobalt Kitty operation), BRONZE BUTLER (forged TGTs for persistent administrative access), and the SeaDuke malware. The technique is operationalized primarily through Mimikatz (kerberos::ptt, sekurlsa::tickets), Rubeus (asktgt, dump, ptt, tgtdeleg), Kekeo, and Impacket (getTGT.py, getST.py, psexec.py with ccache files).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion Lateral Movement
- Sub-technique
- T1550.003 Pass the Ticket
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/
LogScale Detection Query
// Signal 1: PtT Tool Execution — Falcon ProcessRollup2 events
#event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
| FileName = /(?i)(mimikatz|rubeus|kekeo)\.exe/ OR
CommandLine = /(?i)(kerberos::ptt|sekurlsa::tickets|sekurlsa::krbtgt)/ OR
CommandLine = /(?i)(asktgt|asktgs|tgtdeleg|s4u2self|s4u2proxy)/ OR
CommandLine = /(?i)(/ptt|ptt\s+/ticket|/ticket:)/ OR
CommandLine = /(?i)(ticketer|ticketConverter|getTGT|getST)/ OR
CommandLine = /(?i)(harvest\s+/interval|dump\s+/nowrap)/ OR
CommandLine = /(?i)\.(kirbi|ccache)/
| eval ToolType = case(
FileName = /(?i)mimikatz/ OR CommandLine = /(?i)kerberos::ptt|sekurlsa/, "Mimikatz",
FileName = /(?i)rubeus/ OR CommandLine = /(?i)asktgt|tgtdeleg|\.kirbi/, "Rubeus",
CommandLine = /(?i)getTGT|getST|\.ccache/, "Impacket",
true(), "Unknown"
)
| eval DetectionSignal = "PtT Tool Execution"
| table([_timstamp, ComputerName, UserName, FileName, CommandLine, ParentBaseFileName, ToolType, DetectionSignal])
| sort(field=_timstamp, order=desc)
// Signal 2: Kerberos RC4 Ticket Request (Windows Security Event 4769 via Falcon)
// Run as separate saved search:
// #event_simpleName=KerberosTicketGranted OR EventCode=4769
// | TicketEncryptionType = "0x17"
// | UserName != /\$$/ AND ServiceName != /\$$/
// | eval DetectionSignal = "RC4 Kerberos Downgrade"
// | table([_timstamp, ComputerName, UserName, ServiceName, TicketEncryptionType, ClientAddress, DetectionSignal])
// Signal 3: Kerberos LogonType 9 NewCredentials (Windows Security Event 4624)
// #event_simpleName=UserLogon
// | LogonType = "9"
// | AuthenticationPackage = "Kerberos"
// | eval DetectionSignal = "Kerberos NewCredentials Logon (PtT)"
// | table([_timstamp, ComputerName, UserName, LogonType, AuthenticationPackage, DetectionSignal])
// Hunting: Abnormal Kerberos ticket requests per host (volumetric)
// #event_simpleName=ProcessRollup2
// | CommandLine = /(?i)(asktgt|asktgs|tgtdeleg|\.kirbi|\.ccache)/
// | groupBy([ComputerName, UserName], function=count(), as=TicketOpCount)
// | TicketOpCount > 5
// | sort(field=TicketOpCount, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale (Falcon) detection for Pass the Ticket (T1550.003) using Falcon ProcessRollup2 events. Signal 1 matches known PtT tool names (Mimikatz, Rubeus, Kekeo) and attack-specific command-line patterns (ticket injection, kirbi/ccache file references, Kerberos delegation commands). Signals 2 and 3 target Windows Security Events forwarded through Falcon for RC4 Kerberos downgrade and NewCredentials logon type 9 patterns.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Authorized red team or pen test operations running Rubeus or Mimikatz against sanctioned targets during scheduled engagements
- Domain-joined systems in environments that have not enforced AES-only Kerberos will legitimately request RC4-encrypted (0x17) tickets
- IT helpdesk tools or remote management utilities using runas /netonly to access resources under service account credentials generate logon type 9 events
Other platforms for T1550.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Mimikatz kerberos::ptt — Inject Existing Kerberos Ticket
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe, CommandLine containing 'sekurlsa::tickets /export' and 'kerberos::ptt'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess event targeting lsass.exe from mimikatz.exe with GrantedAccess 0x1010 or 0x1438. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create events for .kirbi files in the working directory. Windows Security Event ID 4769 may appear on the domain controller if tickets are subsequently used for network authentication.
- Test 2Rubeus asktgt + ptt — Request and Inject TGT
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=Rubeus.exe, CommandLine containing 'asktgt', '/rc4', and '/ptt'. Windows Security Event ID 4768 on the domain controller: Kerberos Authentication Service with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 (RC4). Windows Security Event ID 4769 with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 if the TGT is then used to request service tickets. Sysmon Event ID 3: NetworkConnect from Rubeus.exe to the domain controller on port 88 (Kerberos).
- Test 3Rubeus dump — Extract All Tickets from LSASS
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=Rubeus.exe, CommandLine='dump /nowrap'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess targeting lsass.exe from Rubeus.exe with GrantedAccess values indicating memory read (0x1010 or similar). Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for %TEMP%\rubeus_tickets.txt. Windows Defender (if enabled) may generate alert for Rubeus.exe based on signature or behavior detection.
- Test 4Impacket getTGT.py + psexec.py — Linux-to-Windows Pass the Ticket
Expected signal: Domain Controller Windows Security Event ID 4768: Kerberos Authentication Service for <USERNAME> from the Linux attack host IP. Domain Controller Event ID 4769: Service ticket request for HOST SPN on <TARGET_HOST>. Target Windows host Event ID 4624: Network Logon (Type 3) from the Linux attack host IP authenticated via Kerberos. Sysmon Event ID 1 on target host: cmd.exe spawned by psexecsvc.exe (Impacket's service executable). Target host Event ID 7045: New service 'PSEXESVC' or similar installed.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=556
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20210515214027/https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
- https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1550.003/T1550.003.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/mandiant-no-easy-breach-dfir-lessons
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
- https://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf
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