Detect Pass the Ticket in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may 'pass the ticket' using stolen Kerberos tickets to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls and credential requirements. Pass the Ticket (PtT) involves injecting a valid Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) or service ticket into a current Windows logon session, allowing authentication to resources as the ticket's owner without knowing the account password. Tickets are typically obtained via OS credential dumping against LSASS memory (using tools like Mimikatz sekurlsa::tickets or Rubeus dump) and then injected with Mimikatz kerberos::ptt or Rubeus ptt. A Silver Ticket attack forges a service ticket using a compromised service account's NTLM hash, granting access to that specific service. A Golden Ticket forges a TGT using the krbtgt account hash, effectively granting domain-wide persistence. 'Overpass the Hash' uses an NTLM hash to request a legitimate Kerberos TGT, bridging Pass the Hash and Pass the Ticket. Real-world users of this technique include APT29 (Kerberos ticket attacks during Nobelium campaigns), APT32 (Cobalt Kitty operation), BRONZE BUTLER (forged TGTs for persistent administrative access), and the SeaDuke malware. The technique is operationalized primarily through Mimikatz (kerberos::ptt, sekurlsa::tickets), Rubeus (asktgt, dump, ptt, tgtdeleg), Kekeo, and Impacket (getTGT.py, getST.py, psexec.py with ccache files).
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion Lateral Movement
- Sub-technique
- T1550.003 Pass the Ticket
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule pass_the_ticket_ptt_detection {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects Pass the Ticket (T1550.003) via known PtT tool execution and Kerberos anomalies"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Lateral Movement"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1550.003"
severity = "CRITICAL"
priority = "HIGH"
events:
// Signal 1: PtT tool execution by process name
$e1.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
$e1.principal.hostname = $hostname
(
re.regex($e1.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(mimikatz|rubeus|kekeo)\.exe$`) or
re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(kerberos::ptt|sekurlsa::tickets|sekurlsa::krbtgt)`) or
re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(asktgt|asktgs|tgtdeleg|s4u2self|s4u2proxy)`) or
re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(/ptt|ptt\s+/ticket|/ticket:)`) or
re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(ticketer|ticketConverter|getTGT|getST)`) or
re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(harvest\s+/interval|dump\s+/nowrap)`) or
re.regex($e1.target.process.command_line, `(?i)\.(kirbi|ccache)`)
)
condition:
$e1
}
rule pass_the_ticket_rc4_kerberos {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects RC4 Kerberos service ticket requests (Event 4769, EncType 0x17) indicating possible Silver/Golden Ticket or PtT downgrade attack"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Lateral Movement"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1550.003"
severity = "HIGH"
priority = "HIGH"
events:
$e2.metadata.event_type = "USER_UNCATEGORIZED"
$e2.metadata.product_event_type = "4769"
$e2.principal.hostname = $hostname
$e2.network.application_protocol = "KERBEROS"
// RC4 encryption type 0x17 indicates possible downgrade or ticket forgery
$e2.security_result.detection_fields["TicketEncryptionType"] = "0x17"
// Exclude machine accounts
not re.regex($e2.target.user.userid, `\$$`)
not re.regex($e2.target.resource.name, `\$$`)
condition:
$e2
}
rule pass_the_ticket_newcredentials_logon {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects Kerberos logon type 9 (NewCredentials, Event 4624) used during PtT ticket injection for outbound lateral movement"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Lateral Movement"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1550.003"
severity = "HIGH"
priority = "MEDIUM"
events:
$e3.metadata.event_type = "USER_LOGIN"
$e3.metadata.product_event_type = "4624"
$e3.principal.hostname = $hostname
$e3.extensions.auth.auth_details = "9" // LogonType 9 = NewCredentials
$e3.extensions.auth.mechanism = "KERBEROS"
// Subject and target users must differ — impersonation indicator
$e3.principal.user.userid != $e3.target.user.userid
condition:
$e3
}Three Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rules for Pass the Ticket detection: (1) PtT tool execution matching Mimikatz/Rubeus/Kekeo process names and command-line patterns for ticket injection commands; (2) RC4 Kerberos service ticket requests (Event 4769 with EncType 0x17) indicating possible ticket downgrade or Silver/Golden Ticket forgery; (3) Kerberos NewCredentials logon type 9 (Event 4624) used when a ticket is injected into a session for outbound lateral movement.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Security tooling or vulnerability scanners that spawn processes with Kerberos-related arguments in authorized testing environments
- Environments with legacy RC4 Kerberos configurations for older applications will legitimately generate 4769 events with EncType 0x17
- Administrators using runas /netonly to access network resources under alternate credentials generate type 9 logon events
Other platforms for T1550.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Mimikatz kerberos::ptt — Inject Existing Kerberos Ticket
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mimikatz.exe, CommandLine containing 'sekurlsa::tickets /export' and 'kerberos::ptt'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess event targeting lsass.exe from mimikatz.exe with GrantedAccess 0x1010 or 0x1438. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create events for .kirbi files in the working directory. Windows Security Event ID 4769 may appear on the domain controller if tickets are subsequently used for network authentication.
- Test 2Rubeus asktgt + ptt — Request and Inject TGT
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=Rubeus.exe, CommandLine containing 'asktgt', '/rc4', and '/ptt'. Windows Security Event ID 4768 on the domain controller: Kerberos Authentication Service with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 (RC4). Windows Security Event ID 4769 with TicketEncryptionType=0x17 if the TGT is then used to request service tickets. Sysmon Event ID 3: NetworkConnect from Rubeus.exe to the domain controller on port 88 (Kerberos).
- Test 3Rubeus dump — Extract All Tickets from LSASS
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=Rubeus.exe, CommandLine='dump /nowrap'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess targeting lsass.exe from Rubeus.exe with GrantedAccess values indicating memory read (0x1010 or similar). Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for %TEMP%\rubeus_tickets.txt. Windows Defender (if enabled) may generate alert for Rubeus.exe based on signature or behavior detection.
- Test 4Impacket getTGT.py + psexec.py — Linux-to-Windows Pass the Ticket
Expected signal: Domain Controller Windows Security Event ID 4768: Kerberos Authentication Service for <USERNAME> from the Linux attack host IP. Domain Controller Event ID 4769: Service ticket request for HOST SPN on <TARGET_HOST>. Target Windows host Event ID 4624: Network Logon (Type 3) from the Linux attack host IP authenticated via Kerberos. Sysmon Event ID 1 on target host: cmd.exe spawned by psexecsvc.exe (Impacket's service executable). Target host Event ID 7045: New service 'PSEXESVC' or similar installed.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/003/
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=556
- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1515
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/how-to-detect-overpass-the-hash-attacks/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20210515214027/https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos
- https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus
- https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1550.003/T1550.003.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/mandiant-no-easy-breach-dfir-lessons
- https://cert.europa.eu/static/WhitePapers/UPDATED%20-%20CERT-EU_Security_Whitepaper_2014-007_Kerberos_Golden_Ticket_Protection_v1_4.pdf
- https://defcon.org/images/defcon-22/dc-22-presentations/Campbell/DEFCON-22-Christopher-Campbell-The-Secret-Life-of-Krbtgt.pdf
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