Which SIEM platforms have a T1547 detection rule?

df00tech provides T1547 (Boot or Logon Autostart Execution) detection queries for 7 SIEM platforms: Microsoft Sentinel / Defender, Splunk, Elastic Security (EQL), IBM QRadar (AQL), Sumo Logic CSE, Google Chronicle / SecOps, CrowdStrike LogScale (CQL).

What data sources are required to detect Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (T1547)?

Detecting Boot or Logon Autostart Execution requires the following data sources: Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint.

What severity and confidence is the T1547 detection?

The T1547 detection is rated high severity with medium confidence.

What are common false positives for T1547?

Common false positives for T1547 include: Software installations that register legitimate autostart entries in Run keys; Windows Updates or Group Policy changes modifying Winlogon or Shell Folders registry keys; Print driver installations that add legitimate port monitors or print processors.

T1547 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Boot or Logon Autostart Execution in Sumo Logic CSE

Adversaries may configure system settings to automatically execute a program during system boot or logon to maintain persistence or gain higher-level privileges on compromised systems. Operating systems may have mechanisms for automatically running a program on system boot or account logon, including automatically executing programs that are placed in specially designated directories or are referenced by repositories that store configuration information, such as the Windows Registry. An adversary may achieve the same goal by modifying or extending features of the kernel. Since some boot or logon autostart programs run with higher privileges, an adversary may leverage these to elevate privileges.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic: Persistence Privilege Escalation
Technique: T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Canonical reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)

sql

_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" OR _sourceCategory="windows/security"
| where EventID in ("12", "13", "14", "4657")
| where TargetObject matches "*\\CurrentVersion\\Run*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\Active Setup\\Installed Components*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\Control\\Lsa\\Authentication Packages*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\Control\\Print\\Monitors*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\Control\\Print\\Environments*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\Services\\W32Time\\TimeProviders*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\Explorer\\Shell Folders*"
  OR TargetObject matches "*\\Explorer\\User Shell Folders*"
| eval action = if(EventID == "12", "KeyCreated", if(EventID == "13", "ValueSet", if(EventID == "14", "KeyRenamed", "RegistryModified")))
| fields _messageTime, Computer, action, TargetObject, Details, Image, User
| sort by _messageTime desc

high severity high confidence

Detects Sysmon registry events (EventID 12/13/14) and Windows Security Event 4657 targeting known autostart execution registry paths used in T1547 persistence. Covers Run keys, Winlogon, LSA authentication/security packages, Print Monitors, and Explorer Shell Folders.

Data Sources

Sysmon via Sumo Logic Windows source (EventID 12, 13, 14)Windows Security log via Sumo Logic (EventID 4657)

Required Tables

windows/sysmonwindows/security

False Positives & Tuning

Windows Update and Windows Installer (msiexec.exe) routinely modify RunOnce keys to schedule cleanup or completion tasks after patch installation, producing high false positive volumes during Patch Tuesday windows
Enterprise software such as Microsoft Teams, Zoom, or Slack silently adds or updates Run key entries for auto-launch on user login, generating benign events at scale
IT asset management and remote support tools (e.g., Dameware, Bomgar) may register themselves in Winlogon notification packages and Active Setup keys during deployment

Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1547

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) Elastic Security (Elastic) IBM QRadar (QRadar) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

Test 1Add Registry Run Key for Persistence
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set on HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with value name 'df00tech-test'. DeviceRegistryEvents with ActionType 'RegistryValueSet'.
Test 2Drop File in Startup Folder
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate in the Startup directory. DeviceFileEvents with ActionType 'FileCreated' in the Startup folder path.
Test 3Modify Winlogon Shell Value
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: Registry value set on Winlogon\Shell. DeviceRegistryEvents with RegistryKey containing 'Winlogon' and RegistryValueName 'Shell'.

Last updated: 2026-04-20 Research depth: deep

References (6)

Response Playbook

1. Examine the full command line and decode any Base64 content...
2. Identify the parent process chain and user context...
3. Check for concurrent network connections from the process...

Investigation Guide

Related techniques: T1027, T1105, T1562.001...
Forensic artifacts: PSReadLine history, Prefetch, ScriptBlock logs...

Atomic Red Team Tests

Test 1: Encoded command execution...
Test 2: Download cradle via Net.WebClient...

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1547 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Related Detections

Sub-techniques (14)

Related Techniques

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLL T1547.002Authentication Package T1547.005Security Support Provider T1547.014Active Setup T1037Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts T1543Create or Modify System Process T1053.005Scheduled Task T1574Hijack Execution Flow T1112Modify Registry

Detect Boot or Logon Autostart Execution in Sumo Logic CSE

MITRE ATT&CK

Sumo Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1547

Testing Methodology

Response Playbook

Investigation Guide

Atomic Red Team Tests

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Sub-techniques (14)

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Persistence

Popular Detections

MITRE ATT&CK

Sumo Detection Query

Data Sources

Required Tables

False Positives & Tuning

Other platforms for T1547

Testing Methodology

Unlock Pro Content

Related Detections

Sub-techniques (14)

Related Techniques

Same Tactic: Persistence

Popular Detections

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