Detect Security Support Provider in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows, including logged-on user Domain passwords and smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded at next boot or via the AddSecurityPackage API. Mimikatz, Empire, and PowerSploit all include SSP persistence capabilities.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.005 Security Support Provider
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') as event_time, logsourcename(logsourceid) as log_source, sourceip, username, "TargetObject", "Details", "Image"
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPEID = 12 AND QIDNAME(qid) = 'Registry value set'
AND ("TargetObject" ILIKE '%\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages' OR "TargetObject" ILIKE '%\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages')
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%kerberos%'
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%msv1_0%'
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%schannel%'
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%wdigest%'
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%tspkg%'
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%pku2u%'
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%cloudAP%'
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%negoexts%'
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%wsauth%'
AND "Details" NOT ILIKE '%livessp%'
AND LAST 24 HOURS
ORDER BY starttime DESCDetects addition of non-standard SSP DLLs to LSA Security Packages registry keys via Sysmon EventCode 13 (registry value set). Flags any SSP value not matching the known-good Windows SSP baseline, indicating potential T1547.005 persistence via credential-stealing SSP implants like mimilib.dll.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Enterprise authentication products (e.g., Centrify, Ping Identity, RSA) that register custom SSP DLLs for identity federation or MFA enforcement
- Windows updates or patches that add or modify SSP entries as part of authentication stack upgrades
- Penetration testing or red team exercises using Mimikatz mimilib.dll or Empire SSP modules in authorized engagements
Other platforms for T1547.005
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Add Malicious SSP via Registry
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet on Control\Lsa\Security Packages with the added 'df00tech-test'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104.
- Test 2Enumerate Current Security Packages
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for reg.exe querying the Lsa key.
- Test 3Mimikatz-style SSP Installation Simulation
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet showing mimilib added to the Security Packages list. MDE DeviceRegistryEvents captures the full multi-string value.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005/
- http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.005/T1547.005.md
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
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