Detect Security Support Provider in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may abuse security support providers (SSPs) to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows SSP DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows, including logged-on user Domain passwords and smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages. An adversary may modify these registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded at next boot or via the AddSecurityPackage API. Mimikatz, Empire, and PowerSploit all include SSP persistence capabilities.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.005 Security Support Provider
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005/
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName=RegGenericValueUpdate
| RegKeyPath = /\\Control\\Lsa\\(OSConfig\\)?Security Packages/i
| RegStringValue != /(?i)(kerberos|msv1_0|schannel|wdigest|tspkg|pku2u|cloudAP|negoexts|wsauth|livessp)/
| RegStringValue != ""
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName, RegKeyPath, RegStringValue, FileName, CommandLine], function=count(as=event_count))
| sort(field=@timestamp, order=desc)Detects SSP persistence (T1547.005) in CrowdStrike Falcon telemetry by identifying registry value updates to LSA Security Packages keys containing non-standard SSP DLL names. Filters known-good Windows SSPs and surfaces novel entries that may indicate Mimikatz mimilib.dll or similar credential-harvesting SSP implant deployment.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate commercial PAM (Privileged Access Management) solutions such as CyberArk or Delinea that register SSP components for privileged session monitoring or credential vaulting
- Windows Server updates that modify Security Packages list as part of cumulative update or authentication stack patching (validate against patch schedule)
- Red team or authorized penetration testing activity using Mimikatz SSP persistence module (validate against scheduled test windows)
Other platforms for T1547.005
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Add Malicious SSP via Registry
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet on Control\Lsa\Security Packages with the added 'df00tech-test'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104.
- Test 2Enumerate Current Security Packages
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for reg.exe querying the Lsa key.
- Test 3Mimikatz-style SSP Installation Simulation
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet showing mimilib added to the Security Packages list. MDE DeviceRegistryEvents captures the full multi-string value.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/005/
- http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.005/T1547.005.md
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz
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