Detect Authentication Package in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of 'Authentication Packages'=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.002 Authentication Package
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT DATEFORMAT(devicetime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time, logsourcename(logsourceid) AS log_source, sourceip, username, QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name, "TargetObject", "Details", "Image" FROM events WHERE LOGSOURCETYPEID(logsourceid) IN (SELECT id FROM logSourceTypes WHERE name ILIKE '%Sysmon%' OR name ILIKE '%Windows%') AND (LOWER("TargetObject") LIKE '%\control\lsa\authentication packages%' OR (LOWER(payload) LIKE '%control\lsa%' AND LOWER(payload) LIKE '%authentication packages%')) AND devicetime > (CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - 86400000) ORDER BY devicetime DESCDetects writes to the HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Authentication Packages registry key using QRadar AQL against Sysmon or Windows Security event sources, indicating potential LSA authentication package persistence.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate third-party authentication software (smart card drivers, biometric packages) modifying the Authentication Packages value during installation
- Windows Update processes reconfiguring LSA authentication packages as part of OS feature changes
- Enterprise endpoint security products that hook into LSA for credential protection (e.g., CrowdStrike, Carbon Black) registering their own packages
Other platforms for T1547.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Add Authentication Package via Registry
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet on HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Authentication Packages. MDE DeviceRegistryEvents with the modified multi-string value.
- Test 2Query Current Authentication Packages
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for reg.exe with command line arguments querying the Lsa key. No registry modification events generated.
- Test 3Add Authentication Package via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet with Image=powershell.exe. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the full script content. Sysmon Event ID 1 for the PowerShell process creation.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002/
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
- http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.002/T1547.002.md
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