Detect Authentication Package in Elastic Security
Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ with the key value of 'Authentication Packages'=<target binary>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.002 Authentication Package
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002/
Elastic Detection Query
registry where registry.path : "*\\Control\\Lsa\\Authentication Packages" and event.action : ("Registry Value Set", "modification")Detects modification of the LSA Authentication Packages registry value, which adversaries abuse to load malicious DLLs at boot via the Local Security Authority process.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate security software (e.g., smart card middleware, third-party MFA agents) that installs custom authentication packages during setup
- Microsoft patches or Windows feature updates that modify LSA authentication settings as part of system configuration
- Enterprise identity management products (e.g., CyberArk, BeyondTrust) that register authentication package DLLs during installation or upgrades
Other platforms for T1547.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Add Authentication Package via Registry
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet on HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Authentication Packages. MDE DeviceRegistryEvents with the modified multi-string value.
- Test 2Query Current Authentication Packages
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for reg.exe with command line arguments querying the Lsa key. No registry modification events generated.
- Test 3Add Authentication Package via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet with Image=powershell.exe. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with the full script content. Sysmon Event ID 1 for the PowerShell process creation.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/002/
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa374733.aspx
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx
- http://docplayer.net/20839173-Analysis-of-malicious-security-support-provider-dlls.html
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.002/T1547.002.md
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