Detect Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder in Elastic Security
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the 'run keys' in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce, HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce. Additional persistence can be achieved through the Startup folder at C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup and the system-wide C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp. The BootExecute value under Session Manager and the load value under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are also abusable.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
Elastic Detection Query
registry where event.action in ("registry_value_set", "registry_key_created") and
registry.path : (
"*\\CurrentVersion\\Run\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce\\*",
"*\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run\\*",
"*\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows\\load",
"*\\Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute"
) and
not process.name : ("msiexec.exe", "TrustedInstaller.exe", "TiWorker.exe", "ccmexec.exe", "MpSigStub.exe") and
(
registry.data.strings : (
"*\\Temp\\*",
"*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*",
"*\\Downloads\\*",
"*\\Public\\*",
"*Recycle.Bin*",
"*\\ProgramData\\*"
) or
registry.data.strings : (
"*.vbs",
"*.js",
"*.bat",
"*.cmd",
"*.ps1",
"*.hta",
"*.wsh",
"*.wsf"
)
)Detects Registry Run Key persistence (T1547.001) by monitoring registry write events to common autorun key paths where the registered value points to suspicious file paths (Temp, Downloads, Public, Recycle.Bin) or script extensions (.vbs, .ps1, .bat, etc.), excluding known trusted Windows maintenance processes.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate software installers (e.g., Spotify, Slack, Teams) that register themselves in HKCU Run keys during installation — especially when the installer runs from a user Downloads folder
- IT management or endpoint agents (Tanium, CrowdStrike, Carbon Black) updating their own run key entries from paths that may temporarily match Temp or ProgramData patterns
- Developer tools such as JetBrains IDE updaters or Node.js-based apps that install helper scripts with .js extension in run keys
- Windows Group Policy application writing entries under Policies\Explorer\Run via gpupdate as part of expected policy deployment
Other platforms for T1547.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Registry Run Key Persistence (HKCU)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet on HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with ValueName 'df00tech-test' and Details 'C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe'. MDE DeviceRegistryEvents with ActionType 'RegistryValueSet'.
- Test 2Startup Folder Persistence via Batch Script
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for df00tech-test.bat in the Startup folder path. Security Event ID 4688 showing cmd.exe creating the file.
- Test 3RunOnceEx Dependency DLL Loading
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 12: Registry key created for RunOnceEx\0001\Depend. Sysmon Event ID 13: Value set with DLL path. MDE DeviceRegistryEvents captures both the key creation and value set.
- Test 4HKLM Run Key via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet with Image=powershell.exe. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for powershell.exe with the Set-ItemProperty command. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry_set
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160214140250/http://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/
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