Detect Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the 'run keys' in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce, HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce. Additional persistence can be achieved through the Startup folder at C:\Users\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup and the system-wide C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp. The BootExecute value under Session Manager and the load value under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows are also abusable.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule t1547_001_registry_run_key_persistence {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects persistence established via Registry Run Keys or Startup Folder (T1547.001). Alerts on writes to common autorun registry paths from non-trusted processes where the value data references suspicious file locations or script extensions."
mitre_attack_technique = "T1547.001"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Persistence, Privilege Escalation"
severity = "HIGH"
confidence = "HIGH"
created = "2026-04-20"
events:
$e.metadata.event_type = "REGISTRY_MODIFICATION"
$e.target.registry.registry_key = /(?i)(CurrentVersion\\Run|CurrentVersion\\RunOnce|CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx|CurrentVersion\\RunServices|Policies\\Explorer\\Run|Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows|Control\\Session Manager\\BootExecute)/
not $e.principal.process.file.full_path = /(?i)(\\msiexec\.exe$|\\TrustedInstaller\.exe$|\\TiWorker\.exe$|\\ccmexec\.exe$|\\MpSigStub\.exe$)/
(
$e.target.registry.registry_value_data = /(?i)(\\Temp\\|\\AppData\\Local\\Temp|\\Downloads\\|\\Public\\|Recycle\.Bin|\\ProgramData\\)/ or
$e.target.registry.registry_value_data = /(?i)\.(vbs|js|bat|cmd|ps1|hta|wsh|wsf)("| |$)/
)
condition:
$e
}Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule matching UDM REGISTRY_MODIFICATION events targeting Windows autorun registry key paths. Fires when a non-trusted process writes a value containing references to writable user paths or script file extensions commonly used to establish persistence.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Enterprise patch management or software distribution agents writing temporary staging script paths into run keys as part of pre-boot or logon-triggered update sequences
- Anti-malware products (Windows Defender, third-party AV) recording temporary script-based remediation tools in run keys during active incident response or cleanup passes
- Legitimate automation frameworks such as Puppet or Chef writing PowerShell bootstrap scripts into run keys for post-provisioning configuration on new endpoints
Other platforms for T1547.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Registry Run Key Persistence (HKCU)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet on HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run with ValueName 'df00tech-test' and Details 'C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe'. MDE DeviceRegistryEvents with ActionType 'RegistryValueSet'.
- Test 2Startup Folder Persistence via Batch Script
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for df00tech-test.bat in the Startup folder path. Security Event ID 4688 showing cmd.exe creating the file.
- Test 3RunOnceEx Dependency DLL Loading
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 12: Registry key created for RunOnceEx\0001\Depend. Sysmon Event ID 13: Value set with DLL path. MDE DeviceRegistryEvents captures both the key creation and value set.
- Test 4HKLM Run Key via PowerShell
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: RegistryValueSet with Image=powershell.exe. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process creation for powershell.exe with the Set-ItemProperty command. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/setupapi/run-and-runonce-registry-keys
- https://oddvar.moe/2018/03/21/persistence-using-runonceex-hidden-from-autoruns-exe/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/registry_set
- https://web.archive.org/web/20160214140250/http://blog.cylance.com/windows-registry-persistence-part-2-the-run-keys-and-search-order
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/sysinfo/32-bit-and-64-bit-application-data-in-the-registry
- https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2013/10/hiding-in-plain-sight/
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