Detect Emond in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a Launch Daemon on macOS that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rule engine, and takes action. The emond rules files are stored at /etc/emond.d/rules/ and rules are defined in plist format. Adversaries can write malicious event rules to these files to execute arbitrary code when a matching event occurs. Emond runs as root — any process or command triggered by an emond rule executes with root privileges, making this both a persistence and privilege escalation technique.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Privilege Escalation Persistence
- Technique
- T1546 Event Triggered Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1546.014 Emond
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT DATEFORMAT(devicetime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
sourceip,
username,
"fileName",
"filePath",
QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
logsourceid,
LOGSOURCETYPENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source_type,
UTF8(payload) AS raw_event
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPENAME(logsourceid) ILIKE '%mac%'
AND devicetime > (CURRENT_TIMESTAMP - 86400000)
AND (
"filePath" ILIKE '%/etc/emond.d/rules/%'
OR "filePath" ILIKE '%/etc/emond.d/%'
OR ("fileName" ILIKE '%.plist' AND UTF8(payload) ILIKE '%emond%')
OR (UTF8(payload) ILIKE '%emond.d%' AND UTF8(payload) ILIKE '%(wrote|created|modified)%')
)
ORDER BY devicetime DESCDetects file write and creation events in the macOS emond rules directory (/etc/emond.d/rules/) or any plist modification associated with the Event Monitor Daemon. Uses QRadar normalized file activity events from macOS endpoints, identifying suspicious persistence activity leveraging emond to execute code as root.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate MDM platforms (Jamf Pro, Kandji) deploying configuration profiles that include emond rule definitions as part of sanctioned endpoint hardening
- macOS system integrity protection (SIP) or Apple Software Update processes touching emond configuration files during OS upgrades
- Enterprise security tools performing file integrity monitoring that generate read events misclassified as write activity in QRadar normalization
Other platforms for T1546.014
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Create Malicious Emond Rule for Startup Persistence
Expected signal: File creation event for /etc/emond.d/rules/argus_test.plist. Process creation for tee writing to the rules directory. On next startup or emond reload, emond spawns the touch command as root — file creation event for /tmp/emond_executed.
- Test 2Verify Emond Service Status
Expected signal: Process creation for launchctl and ls. Read-only — no modifications. Output shows emond service state and all existing rule files.
- Test 3Create Emond Authentication Event Rule
Expected signal: File creation event for /etc/emond.d/rules/argus_auth_test.plist. The authentication event trigger fires on user login, causing emond to spawn the touch command as root.
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