T1546.014 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Emond in Elastic Security

Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a Launch Daemon on macOS that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rule engine, and takes action. The emond rules files are stored at /etc/emond.d/rules/ and rules are defined in plist format. Adversaries can write malicious event rules to these files to execute arbitrary code when a matching event occurs. Emond runs as root — any process or command triggered by an emond rule executes with root privileges, making this both a persistence and privilege escalation technique.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Privilege Escalation Persistence
Technique
T1546 Event Triggered Execution
Sub-technique
T1546.014 Emond
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/014/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
file where host.os.type == "macos" and
  event.type in ("creation", "change") and
  (
    file.path like "/etc/emond.d/rules/*" or
    file.path like "/etc/emond.d/*" or
    (file.extension == "plist" and file.path like "*emond*")
  )
high severity high confidence

Detects file creation or modification events targeting the macOS Event Monitor Daemon (emond) rules directory /etc/emond.d/rules/ or any plist file associated with emond. Adversaries write malicious plist-based rules to this directory to achieve persistence and privilege escalation, as emond executes all triggered rule actions as root.

Data Sources

Elastic EndpointAuditbeat (file integrity module)

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.file-*auditbeat-*

False Positives & Tuning

  • macOS system updates or Apple software components legitimately modifying emond rule files during OS patching or configuration management
  • MDM/EMM solutions such as Jamf or Mosyle pushing endpoint configuration policies that write to /etc/emond.d/ as part of sanctioned device management
  • Security software or FIM agents inspecting or backing up emond rule files during scheduled compliance scans
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1546.014


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Create Malicious Emond Rule for Startup Persistence

    Expected signal: File creation event for /etc/emond.d/rules/argus_test.plist. Process creation for tee writing to the rules directory. On next startup or emond reload, emond spawns the touch command as root — file creation event for /tmp/emond_executed.

  2. Test 2Verify Emond Service Status

    Expected signal: Process creation for launchctl and ls. Read-only — no modifications. Output shows emond service state and all existing rule files.

  3. Test 3Create Emond Authentication Event Rule

    Expected signal: File creation event for /etc/emond.d/rules/argus_auth_test.plist. The authentication event trigger fires on user login, causing emond to spawn the touch command as root.

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1546.014 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

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