T1546.012 Sumo Logic CSE · Sumo

Detect Image File Execution Options Injection in Sumo Logic CSE

Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debugger values. IFEO enables developers to attach debuggers to applications. Registry keys in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\{binary}.exe can be set with a Debugger value that allows a debugger to be launched automatically when the specified binary is executed. Adversaries abuse this by setting the Debugger value to their malicious payload — whenever the target binary executes, Windows launches the adversary's payload instead (with the target binary name as an argument). This can be used to replace legitimate processes, persist on reboot, or escalate privileges.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Privilege Escalation Persistence
Technique
T1546 Event Triggered Execution
Sub-technique
T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/

Sumo Detection Query

Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo)
sql
(_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" OR _sourceCategory="windows/security")
| where EventCode in ("12", "13")
| where TargetObject matches "*Image File Execution Options*"
| where TargetObject matches "*Debugger*" OR TargetObject matches "*GlobalFlag*" OR TargetObject matches "*MitigationOptions*"
| parse regex field=TargetObject "Image File Execution Options\\\\(?<TargetBinary>[^\\\\]+)\\\\" nodrop
| eval IsAccessibilityBin = if(
    TargetBinary matches /(?i)(sethc|utilman|osk|magnify|narrator|displayswitch|atbroker)\.exe/,
    1, 0
  )
| eval IsHighValueBin = if(
    TargetBinary matches /(?i)(taskmgr|regedit|msconfig|cmd|powershell|mmc)\.exe/,
    1, 0
  )
| eval IsDebuggerKey = if(TargetObject matches "*Debugger*", 1, 0)
| eval IsGlobalFlag = if(TargetObject matches "*GlobalFlag*" AND Details = "512", 1, 0)
| eval SuspiciousPayload = if(
    Details matches /(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell|mshta|wscript|cscript|rundll32|regsvr32|appdata|\\temp\\|programdata)/,
    1, 0
  )
| eval DetectionType = if(IsAccessibilityBin = 1 AND IsDebuggerKey = 1, "IFEO_ACCESSIBILITY_BACKDOOR",
    if(IsHighValueBin = 1 AND IsDebuggerKey = 1, "IFEO_SYSBIN_HIJACK",
    if(IsGlobalFlag = 1, "IFEO_SILENT_EXIT",
    if(SuspiciousPayload = 1 AND IsDebuggerKey = 1, "IFEO_SUSPICIOUS_DEBUGGER",
    if(IsDebuggerKey = 1, "IFEO_DEBUGGER_SET", "IFEO_KEY_MODIFIED")))))
| fields _messageTime, Computer, User, EventCode, DetectionType, TargetBinary, TargetObject, Details, Image, CommandLine
| sort by _messageTime desc
high severity high confidence

Detects IFEO registry key manipulation via Sysmon EventCode 12/13 in Sumo Logic, classifying detections by target binary sensitivity and payload characteristics. Prioritizes accessibility binary backdoors (sethc.exe, utilman.exe) and silent exit monitor abuse (GlobalFlag=512).

Data Sources

Windows Sysmon operational log (EventCode 12 — Registry Key Create, EventCode 13 — Registry Value Set)Windows Security Event Log

Required Tables

_sourceCategory=windows/sysmon_sourceCategory=windows/security

False Positives & Tuning

  • Crash dump and debugging utilities (ProcDump, Dr. Watson, WER) that register themselves as JIT debuggers via IFEO Debugger values on specific application binaries during incident response
  • Application performance monitoring agents that set IFEO MitigationOptions to disable DEP or ASLR on legacy applications for compatibility in controlled environments
  • IT management tooling or software packaging systems (e.g., InstallShield, WiX) that write IFEO keys during installation or uninstallation of software that includes crash reporting modules
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1546.012


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1IFEO Debugger Injection on cmd.exe

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: TargetObject=Image File Execution Options\cmd.exe\Debugger, Details=C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe. Process creation for reg.exe. If cmd.exe is then launched, notepad.exe starts with cmd.exe as its argument.

  2. Test 2IFEO GlobalFlag for SilentProcessExit

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 records: GlobalFlag set to 512 in IFEO\notepad.exe, and MonitorProcess set in SilentProcessExit\notepad.exe. The combination of GlobalFlag=512 and MonitorProcess registration is the SilentProcessExit technique.

  3. Test 3Enumerate All IFEO Debugger Registrations

    Expected signal: Process creation for reg.exe with query /s flags. Read-only enumeration. Output reveals all IFEO Debugger and GlobalFlag values across all registered binaries.

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