Detect Image File Execution Options Injection in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by Image File Execution Options (IFEO) debugger values. IFEO enables developers to attach debuggers to applications. Registry keys in HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\{binary}.exe can be set with a Debugger value that allows a debugger to be launched automatically when the specified binary is executed. Adversaries abuse this by setting the Debugger value to their malicious payload — whenever the target binary executes, Windows launches the adversary's payload instead (with the target binary name as an argument). This can be used to replace legitimate processes, persist on reboot, or escalate privileges.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Privilege Escalation Persistence
- Technique
- T1546 Event Triggered Execution
- Sub-technique
- T1546.012 Image File Execution Options Injection
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName in ("RegGenericValueUpdate", "AsepValueUpdate", "RegSystemConfigValueUpdate")
| TargetObject = /(?i)Image\s+File\s+Execution\s+Options/
| ValueName = /(?i)^(Debugger|GlobalFlag|MitigationOptions)$/
| IsAccessibilityTarget := TargetObject = /(?i)(sethc\.exe|utilman\.exe|osk\.exe|magnify\.exe|narrator\.exe|displayswitch\.exe|atbroker\.exe)/
| IsHighValueTarget := TargetObject = /(?i)(taskmgr\.exe|regedit\.exe|msconfig\.exe|cmd\.exe|powershell\.exe|mmc\.exe)/
| SuspiciousPayload := RegStringValue = /(?i)(cmd\.exe|powershell|mshta|wscript|cscript|rundll32|regsvr32|AppData|\\Temp\\|ProgramData)/
| IsSilentExit := ValueName = "GlobalFlag" AND RegStringValue = "512"
| DetectionType := if(IsAccessibilityTarget AND ValueName = "Debugger", "IFEO_ACCESSIBILITY_BACKDOOR",
if(IsHighValueTarget AND ValueName = "Debugger", "IFEO_SYSBIN_HIJACK",
if(IsSilentExit, "IFEO_SILENT_EXIT",
if(SuspiciousPayload AND ValueName = "Debugger", "IFEO_SUSPICIOUS_DEBUGGER",
if(ValueName = "Debugger", "IFEO_DEBUGGER_SET", "IFEO_KEY_MODIFIED")))))
| where IsAccessibilityTarget OR IsHighValueTarget OR SuspiciousPayload OR IsSilentExit
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName, DetectionType, TargetObject, ValueName, RegStringValue, ContextImageFileName, CommandLine], function=count(as=EventCount))
| sort(EventCount, order=desc)CrowdStrike LogScale detection for IFEO injection using Falcon registry event types (RegGenericValueUpdate, AsepValueUpdate). Filters on IFEO key path and Debugger/GlobalFlag/MitigationOptions value names, then classifies detections by target binary risk tier and payload characteristics.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Developer tooling such as WinDbg, Visual Studio debugger, or x64dbg registering as a JIT debugger via IFEO on development machines — cross-reference ComputerName against developer workstation OU or asset tag
- Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or vulnerability management agents that write MitigationOptions values to harden specific binaries as part of policy enforcement
- Legacy application compatibility fixes applied via Microsoft Application Compatibility Toolkit that redirect obsolete executable names to updated versions via IFEO Debugger values
Other platforms for T1546.012
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1IFEO Debugger Injection on cmd.exe
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13: TargetObject=Image File Execution Options\cmd.exe\Debugger, Details=C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe. Process creation for reg.exe. If cmd.exe is then launched, notepad.exe starts with cmd.exe as its argument.
- Test 2IFEO GlobalFlag for SilentProcessExit
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 records: GlobalFlag set to 512 in IFEO\notepad.exe, and MonitorProcess set in SilentProcessExit\notepad.exe. The combination of GlobalFlag=512 and MonitorProcess registration is the SilentProcessExit technique.
- Test 3Enumerate All IFEO Debugger Registrations
Expected signal: Process creation for reg.exe with query /s flags. Read-only enumeration. Output reveals all IFEO Debugger and GlobalFlag values across all registered binaries.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1546.012/T1546.012.md
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/enabling-postmortem-debugging
- https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2009/08/14/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/
- https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lolbas-part-3
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