Detect Cloud Account in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may create cloud accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Cloud accounts include user accounts, service principals, managed identities (Azure), IAM users and roles (AWS), and service accounts (GCP). With sufficient access, adversaries create secondary credentialed accounts that do not require persistent remote access tools. Known actors include APT29 (creating Azure AD users), LAPSUS$ (creating global admin accounts in victim cloud tenants), and the AADInternals toolkit. Cloud accounts can be scoped to specific services to reduce detection surface and are often followed by credential additions or role escalation for persistence.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence
- Technique
- T1136 Create Account
- Sub-technique
- T1136.003 Cloud Account
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
QRadar Detection Query
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
CATEGORYNAME(category) AS event_category,
LOGSOURCENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source,
username AS actor,
"Account Name" AS target_account,
sourceip AS source_ip,
CASE
WHEN LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%createuser%' OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%createrole%' THEN 'AWS'
WHEN LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%add user%' OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%add service principal%' THEN 'AzureAD'
WHEN LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%new-msoluser%' OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%add user.%' THEN 'O365'
ELSE 'Unknown'
END AS cloud_platform,
CASE
WHEN LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%service principal%' OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%role%' OR LOWER(QIDNAME(qid)) LIKE '%application%' THEN 1
ELSE 0
END AS is_service_account
FROM events
WHERE
LOGSOURCETYPEID IN (
SELECT id FROM SDE_LogSourceType WHERE name LIKE '%Azure%' OR name LIKE '%AWS%' OR name LIKE '%Office 365%' OR name LIKE '%Microsoft 365%'
)
AND (
QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%Add user%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%Add service principal%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%Add application%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%Add service principal credentials%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%CreateUser%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%CreateRole%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%CreateServiceLinkedRole%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%CreateVirtualMFADevice%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%New-MsolUser%'
OR QIDNAME(qid) ILIKE '%New-AzureADUser%'
)
AND magnitude >= 3
AND starttime > NOW() - 1 DAYS
ORDER BY starttime DESCDetects cloud account creation events across Azure AD, AWS CloudTrail, and Office 365 audit sources in QRadar. Covers user accounts, service principals, IAM roles, and service-linked roles created by adversaries for persistent access.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Automated provisioning systems (Ansible, Puppet, Terraform) that run account creation as part of scheduled infrastructure management tasks
- HR system integrations that sync new employee records into cloud directories on hire date, triggering bulk account creation events
- Break-glass or emergency access procedures where security or IT ops create temporary privileged accounts during incident response
Other platforms for T1136.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Create Azure AD User via Azure CLI
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: OperationName='Add user', Result='success', InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName=<your admin UPN>, TargetResources[0].displayName='df00tech-test-user'. The event appears within 1-2 minutes of execution.
- Test 2Create Azure Service Principal via PowerShell (AADInternals Pattern)
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: two sequential events — OperationName='Add application' followed within seconds by OperationName='Add service principal', then OperationName='Add service principal credentials'. All three events share the same CorrelationId or occur within the same 1-minute window from the same InitiatedBy UPN.
- Test 3Create AWS IAM User with Access Keys
Expected signal: AWS CloudTrail: CreateUser event with requestParameters.userName='df00tech-atomic-test-user' and responseElements.user.arn containing the new user ARN. Followed within seconds by CreateAccessKey event with the same userName. Both events share the sourceIPAddress of the calling machine and the userIdentity.arn of the executing role.
- Test 4Create Azure AD User via AADInternals PowerShell Module
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: OperationName='Add user', Result='success'. The InitiatedBy field will show the authenticated user's UPN (not an application identity, since AADInternals authenticates as the user). Sysmon Event ID 1 on the Windows host: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'AADInternals' and 'New-AADIntUser'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 captures the full command including credentials (monitor for this in SIEM).
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html
- https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/app-objects-and-service-principals?tabs=browser
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
- https://aadinternals.com/aadinternals/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.md
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