Detect Cloud Account in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may create cloud accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Cloud accounts include user accounts, service principals, managed identities (Azure), IAM users and roles (AWS), and service accounts (GCP). With sufficient access, adversaries create secondary credentialed accounts that do not require persistent remote access tools. Known actors include APT29 (creating Azure AD users), LAPSUS$ (creating global admin accounts in victim cloud tenants), and the AADInternals toolkit. Cloud accounts can be scoped to specific services to reduce detection surface and are often followed by credential additions or role escalation for persistence.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence
- Technique
- T1136 Create Account
- Sub-technique
- T1136.003 Cloud Account
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule t1136_003_cloud_account_creation {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects cloud account creation across Azure AD, AWS IAM, and GCP IAM. Covers user accounts, service principals, IAM users, roles, and service accounts used by adversaries for persistent cloud access."
mitre_attack_technique = "T1136.003"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Persistence"
severity = "HIGH"
priority = "HIGH"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/"
events:
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "USER_CREATION"
or $e.metadata.event_type = "SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CREATION"
or (
$e.metadata.product_name = "Microsoft Azure"
and $e.metadata.product_event_type in (
"Add user",
"Add service principal",
"Add application",
"Add service principal credentials"
)
and $e.security_result.action = "ALLOW"
)
or (
$e.metadata.product_name = "Amazon Web Services"
and $e.metadata.product_event_type in (
"CreateUser",
"CreateRole",
"CreateServiceLinkedRole",
"CreateVirtualMFADevice"
)
and not $e.security_result.action = "BLOCK"
)
or (
$e.metadata.product_name = "Google Cloud Platform"
and $e.metadata.product_event_type in (
"google.iam.admin.v1.CreateServiceAccount",
"google.iam.v1.IAMPolicy.SetIamPolicy",
"CreateServiceAccountKey"
)
)
or (
$e.metadata.product_name = "Microsoft Office 365"
and $e.metadata.product_event_type in (
"Add user.",
"New-MsolUser",
"New-AzureADUser"
)
)
)
$e.principal.user.userid != ""
condition:
$e
}Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting cloud account creation events across Azure AD, AWS IAM, GCP IAM, and Office 365. Triggers on USER_CREATION and SERVICE_ACCOUNT_CREATION UDM event types as well as platform-specific product event types for comprehensive cloud coverage.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate cloud administrator creating new user accounts during employee onboarding or contractor access provisioning through standard HR workflows
- Infrastructure-as-Code pipelines (Terraform, Pulumi, CDK) creating service accounts and IAM roles as part of automated environment deployment
- Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) or identity governance platform performing account lifecycle management, including provisioning accounts from an authoritative HR source
Other platforms for T1136.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Create Azure AD User via Azure CLI
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: OperationName='Add user', Result='success', InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName=<your admin UPN>, TargetResources[0].displayName='df00tech-test-user'. The event appears within 1-2 minutes of execution.
- Test 2Create Azure Service Principal via PowerShell (AADInternals Pattern)
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: two sequential events — OperationName='Add application' followed within seconds by OperationName='Add service principal', then OperationName='Add service principal credentials'. All three events share the same CorrelationId or occur within the same 1-minute window from the same InitiatedBy UPN.
- Test 3Create AWS IAM User with Access Keys
Expected signal: AWS CloudTrail: CreateUser event with requestParameters.userName='df00tech-atomic-test-user' and responseElements.user.arn containing the new user ARN. Followed within seconds by CreateAccessKey event with the same userName. Both events share the sourceIPAddress of the calling machine and the userIdentity.arn of the executing role.
- Test 4Create Azure AD User via AADInternals PowerShell Module
Expected signal: Azure AD AuditLogs: OperationName='Add user', Result='success'. The InitiatedBy field will show the authenticated user's UPN (not an application identity, since AADInternals authenticates as the user). Sysmon Event ID 1 on the Windows host: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'AADInternals' and 'New-AADIntUser'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 captures the full command including credentials (monitor for this in SIEM).
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office365/admin/add-users/about-admin-roles?view=o365-worldwide
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/UserGuide/id_users_create.html
- https://support.google.com/cloudidentity/answer/7332836?hl=en&ref_topic=7558554
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/add-users-azure-active-directory
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/app-objects-and-service-principals?tabs=browser
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/10/25/nobelium-targeting-delegated-administrative-privileges-to-facilitate-broader-attacks/
- https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/
- https://aadinternals.com/aadinternals/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1136.003/T1136.003.md
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