Detect Clipboard Data in Elastic Security
Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. On Windows, adversaries can read clipboard contents using PowerShell's Get-Clipboard cmdlet, the Win32 API functions OpenClipboard() and GetClipboardData(), or by invoking clip.exe in combination with scripting. macOS and Linux provide pbpaste and xclip/xsel utilities respectively. Clipboard content frequently contains high-value data including passwords copied from password managers, authentication tokens, cryptocurrency wallet addresses, PII, and internal URLs. Advanced malware such as Agent Tesla, RTM, Astaroth, CHIMNEYSWEEP, and DarkComet implement persistent clipboard monitoring loops that exfiltrate captured content, while crypto-clippers (a subclass) additionally replace clipboard content with attacker-controlled values to hijack cryptocurrency transactions.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115/
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.id with maxspan=5m
[process where event.type == "start" and
(
(
process.name in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "python.exe", "python3.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe") and
process.command_line like~ ("*Get-Clipboard*", "*GetClipboard*", "*get-clipboard*", "*OpenClipboard*", "*GetClipboardData*", "*win32clipboard*", "*pyperclip*", "*clipboard.paste*", "*System.Windows.Forms.Clipboard*", "*[Windows.Forms.Clipboard]*", "*Clipboard.GetText*", "*Clipboard::GetText*", "*GetOpenClipboardWindow*")
) or
(
process.name in~ ("clip.exe", "pbpaste", "xclip", "xsel", "xdotool") and
process.parent.name in~ ("winword.exe", "excel.exe", "powerpnt.exe", "outlook.exe", "mshta.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe", "msiexec.exe", "cmd.exe", "wmic.exe", "schtasks.exe", "python.exe", "python3.exe", "perl.exe", "ruby.exe", "node.exe")
) or
(
process.name in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and
process.command_line like~ "*Get-Clipboard*" and
(process.command_line like~ "*while*" or process.command_line like~ "*Start-Sleep*" or process.command_line like~ "*loop*")
)
)
] by process.entity_idDetects clipboard data collection via scripting engines invoking clipboard APIs (PowerShell Get-Clipboard, Python win32clipboard/pyperclip, .NET Forms Clipboard), native clipboard utilities launched from suspicious parent processes, and persistent clipboard monitoring loop patterns. Covers Windows, macOS (pbpaste), and Linux (xclip/xsel) vectors.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate password manager utilities (1Password, KeePass, Bitwarden CLI) that interface with the clipboard for copy-to-clipboard operations
- IT automation scripts that use clipboard APIs for legitimate content transformation pipelines (e.g. RPA tools, AutoHotkey scripts run by business users)
- Developers testing clipboard functionality in IDEs or running unit tests for clipboard-aware applications (xclip/xsel used in shell scripts for terminal utilities)
Other platforms for T1115
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1PowerShell Clipboard Harvest via Get-Clipboard
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-Clipboard'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for %TEMP%\df00tech-clip-test.txt. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 showing the full Get-Clipboard invocation. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled.
- Test 2PowerShell Persistent Clipboard Monitoring Loop
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine containing 'Get-Clipboard', 'while', 'Start-Sleep', and '-WindowStyle Hidden'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 showing the full loop. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create and multiple File Modify events for the staging file. Multiple writes to the staging file visible in DeviceFileEvents.
- Test 3Python Clipboard Theft via win32clipboard
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=python.exe, CommandLine containing 'win32clipboard', 'OpenClipboard', and 'GetClipboardData'. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. Note: requires pywin32 package installed (pip install pywin32).
- Test 4Linux Clipboard Exfiltration via xclip
Expected signal: Auditd syscall log with EXECVE for xclip with arguments '-selection clipboard -o'. Syslog process creation event for xclip. File creation event for /tmp/df00tech-clipboard-capture.txt. If Sysmon for Linux is deployed: EventCode=1 with Image=/usr/bin/xclip.
- Test 5macOS Clipboard Collection via pbpaste
Expected signal: macOS Unified Log (ULS): process creation for pbpaste with arguments. File creation for /tmp/df00tech-clipboard-macos.txt. If Jamf or similar MDM telemetry is deployed, process execution event with parent shell context. ESF (Endpoint Security Framework) events if EDR is deployed.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115/
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/clip
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-200b
- https://blog.reversinglabs.com/blog/mining-for-malicious-ruby-gems
- https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1115/T1115.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant
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