Detect Clipboard Data in Google Chronicle
Adversaries may collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. On Windows, adversaries can read clipboard contents using PowerShell's Get-Clipboard cmdlet, the Win32 API functions OpenClipboard() and GetClipboardData(), or by invoking clip.exe in combination with scripting. macOS and Linux provide pbpaste and xclip/xsel utilities respectively. Clipboard content frequently contains high-value data including passwords copied from password managers, authentication tokens, cryptocurrency wallet addresses, PII, and internal URLs. Advanced malware such as Agent Tesla, RTM, Astaroth, CHIMNEYSWEEP, and DarkComet implement persistent clipboard monitoring loops that exfiltrate captured content, while crypto-clippers (a subclass) additionally replace clipboard content with attacker-controlled values to hijack cryptocurrency transactions.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1115 Clipboard Data
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115/
YARA-L Detection Query
rule t1115_clipboard_data_collection {
meta:
author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
description = "Detects clipboard data collection via scripting engine API abuse, native clipboard utilities launched from suspicious parent processes, and persistent clipboard monitoring loops (MITRE ATT&CK T1115)"
mitre_attack_tactic = "Collection"
mitre_attack_technique = "T1115"
severity = "HIGH"
confidence = "HIGH"
version = "1.0"
created = "2026-04-18"
events:
(
// Branch 1: Script engines invoking clipboard APIs
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and (
re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe|python[0-9]*\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|mshta\.exe|perl\.exe|ruby\.exe|node\.exe)$`)
)
and (
re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `(?i)(get-clipboard|getclipboard|openclipboard|getclipboarddata|win32clipboard|pyperclip|clipboard\.paste|system\.windows\.forms\.clipboard|clipboard::gettext|clipboard\.gettext|getopencl ipboardwindow)`)
)
)
or
// Branch 2: Native clipboard utilities from suspicious parents
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(clip\.exe|xclip|xsel|xdotool|pbpaste)$`)
and re.regex($e.principal.process.parent_process.file.full_path, `(?i)(winword\.exe|excel\.exe|powerpnt\.exe|outlook\.exe|mshta\.exe|wscript\.exe|cscript\.exe|regsvr32\.exe|rundll32\.exe|msiexec\.exe|python[0-9]*\.exe|perl\.exe|ruby\.exe|node\.exe)$`)
)
or
// Branch 3: Clipboard monitoring loop pattern
(
$e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
and re.regex($e.principal.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(powershell\.exe|pwsh\.exe)$`)
and re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `(?i)get-clipboard`)
and re.regex($e.principal.process.command_line, `(?i)(while|start-sleep|foreach|-loop)`)
)
)
condition:
$e
} Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting MITRE ATT&CK T1115 clipboard data collection across three behavioral branches: (1) scripting engines (PowerShell, Python, WScript, etc.) invoking known clipboard APIs including Get-Clipboard, win32clipboard, pyperclip, and OpenClipboard; (2) native clipboard utilities (clip.exe, xclip, xsel, pbpaste) spawned from suspicious parent processes; (3) persistent PowerShell clipboard monitoring loops using while/Start-Sleep patterns indicative of malware like Agent Tesla.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Security awareness training tools that demonstrate clipboard hijacking by reading/writing clipboard content during controlled educational exercises on employee workstations
- Custom internal tooling that wraps clip.exe or xclip for log collection or report generation pipelines launched from document macros in controlled environments
- Browser automation frameworks (Selenium, Playwright) used in QA environments that interact with clipboard during end-to-end test execution
Other platforms for T1115
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1PowerShell Clipboard Harvest via Get-Clipboard
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe, CommandLine containing 'Get-Clipboard'. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create for %TEMP%\df00tech-clip-test.txt. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 showing the full Get-Clipboard invocation. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled.
- Test 2PowerShell Persistent Clipboard Monitoring Loop
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine containing 'Get-Clipboard', 'while', 'Start-Sleep', and '-WindowStyle Hidden'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 showing the full loop. Sysmon Event ID 11: File Create and multiple File Modify events for the staging file. Multiple writes to the staging file visible in DeviceFileEvents.
- Test 3Python Clipboard Theft via win32clipboard
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=python.exe, CommandLine containing 'win32clipboard', 'OpenClipboard', and 'GetClipboardData'. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. Note: requires pywin32 package installed (pip install pywin32).
- Test 4Linux Clipboard Exfiltration via xclip
Expected signal: Auditd syscall log with EXECVE for xclip with arguments '-selection clipboard -o'. Syslog process creation event for xclip. File creation event for /tmp/df00tech-clipboard-capture.txt. If Sysmon for Linux is deployed: EventCode=1 with Image=/usr/bin/xclip.
- Test 5macOS Clipboard Collection via pbpaste
Expected signal: macOS Unified Log (ULS): process creation for pbpaste with arguments. File creation for /tmp/df00tech-clipboard-macos.txt. If Jamf or similar MDM telemetry is deployed, process execution event with parent shell context. ESF (Endpoint Security Framework) events if EDR is deployed.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1115/
- https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms649012
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/clip
- https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-200b
- https://blog.reversinglabs.com/blog/mining-for-malicious-ruby-gems
- https://medium.com/rvrsh3ll/operating-with-empyre-ea764eda3363
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1115/T1115.md
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-deviceprocessevents-table
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/analysis-of-new-agent-tesla-spyware-variant
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