Detect Account Manipulation in Elastic Security
Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. Account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged Valid Accounts.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Persistence Privilege Escalation
- Technique
- T1098 Account Manipulation
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
Elastic Detection Query
any where event.code in ("4738", "4670", "4732", "4728", "4756", "4735", "4648") and winlog.channel == "Security" and not winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName in ("-", "SYSTEM", "LOCAL SERVICE", "NETWORK SERVICE") and (
event.code in ("4738", "4670", "4648") or
(
event.code in ("4732", "4728", "4756", "4735") and
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ ("*Domain Admins*" or "*Enterprise Admins*" or "*Schema Admins*" or "*Administrators*" or "*Account Operators*" or "*Backup Operators*" or "*Print Operators*" or "*Server Operators*" or "*Group Policy Creator Owners*" or "*Remote Management Users*" or "*ESX Admins*")
)
)Detects T1098 Account Manipulation by monitoring Windows Security Event IDs 4738 (user account changed), 4670 (permissions changed), 4732/4728/4756 (group membership additions to sensitive groups), 4735 (local group modified), and 4648 (explicit credential logon). Filters out built-in noise accounts. Maps directly to Sentinel KQL and Splunk SPL logic using ECS fields via Winlogbeat/Elastic Agent ingestion.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Automated provisioning systems (e.g., Active Directory management tools like AD Manager Plus, SailPoint) that routinely modify group memberships and account properties during normal onboarding/offboarding workflows
- IT helpdesk staff performing legitimate password resets or account unlocks in bulk during business hours, especially Monday mornings after weekend lockouts
- Service account maintenance scripts that rotate credentials or adjust permissions as part of scheduled maintenance windows — particularly common in enterprise environments with quarterly access reviews
Other platforms for T1098
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Add User to Local Administrators Group
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4732: A member was added to a security-enabled local group. SubjectUserName = actor, TargetUserName = Administrators (group), MemberName = df00tech-testuser. Sysmon Event ID 1 if executed via cmd.exe: Process Create with Image=net.exe, CommandLine='net localgroup Administrators df00tech-testuser /add'.
- Test 2Modify User Account Password — Simulate Credential Manipulation
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4738: A user account was changed. SubjectUserName = executing account, TargetUserName = df00tech-testuser. The 'Changed Attributes' section will show 'Password Last Set' updated. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with net.exe command line visible.
- Test 3Disable Password Expiry on Account (UserAccountControl Manipulation)
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4738: A user account was changed. The event detail will show UserAccountControl change with the new value including the DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD flag (0x10000 bit set). SubjectUserName identifies the actor performing the change.
- Test 4Rename Administrator Account (Lazarus Group TTPs)
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4738: A user account was changed. TargetUserName will show the new account name, and 'SAM Account Name' in the changed attributes will reflect the rename. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with wmic.exe and the rename command visible in CommandLine.
- Test 5Grant Remote Desktop Access via Group Membership
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4732: A member was added to a security-enabled local group. TargetUserName = Remote Desktop Users, MemberName = df00tech-testuser, SubjectUserName = executing account. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with Add-LocalGroupMember in CommandLine.
References (10)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4738
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4670
- https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4732
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4738
- https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM
- https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/issues/92
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/06/darkside-affiliate-supply-chain-software-compromise.html
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/01/the-mass-exploitation-of-on-premises-exchange-servers/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1098/T1098.md
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