T1087 IBM QRadar · QRadar

Detect Account Discovery in IBM QRadar

Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers. Adversaries may use several methods to enumerate accounts, including abuse of existing tools, built-in commands, and potential misconfigurations that leak account names and roles or permissions in the targeted environment. On Windows, common discovery methods include net user, net localgroup, wmic useraccount list, Get-LocalUser, and Get-ADUser. On Linux and macOS, adversaries may read /etc/passwd, use getent, id, last, and who commands. In cloud environments, CLIs such as aws iam list-users, az ad user list, and gcloud iam service-accounts list are commonly abused. Observed threat actors leveraging this technique include Aquatic Panda, Scattered Spider, FIN13, and malware families such as Woody RAT, Havoc, TONESHELL, and ShimRatReporter.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Discovery
Technique
T1087 Account Discovery
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/

QRadar Detection Query

IBM QRadar (QRadar)
sql 
SELECT
  DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'yyyy-MM-dd HH:mm:ss') AS event_time,
  sourceip,
  username,
  "Process Name" AS process_name,
  "Command" AS command_line,
  "Parent Process Name" AS parent_process,
  QIDNAME(qid) AS event_name,
  LOGSOURCETYPENAME(logsourceid) AS log_source_type,
  CASE WHEN LOWER("Command") LIKE '%net user%' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
  CASE WHEN LOWER("Command") LIKE '%net localgroup%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%net group%' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
  CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%wmic.exe%' AND (LOWER("Command") LIKE '%useraccount%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '% group%') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
  CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%dsquery.exe%' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
  CASE WHEN LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%nltest.exe%' THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
  CASE WHEN LOWER("Command") LIKE '%whoami%' AND (LOWER("Command") LIKE '%/groups%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%/all%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%/priv%') THEN 1 ELSE 0 END +
  CASE WHEN (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%powershell.exe%' OR LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%pwsh.exe%') AND (
    LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-localuser%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-localgroup%' OR
    LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-aduser%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-adgroupmember%' OR
    LOWER("Command") LIKE '%directorysearcher%'
  ) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END AS discovery_score
FROM events
WHERE (
  (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%net.exe%' AND (LOWER("Command") LIKE '%net user%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%net localgroup%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%net group%'))
  OR (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%net1.exe%' AND (LOWER("Command") LIKE '%net user%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%net localgroup%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%net group%'))
  OR (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%wmic.exe%' AND (LOWER("Command") LIKE '%useraccount%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '% group%'))
  OR LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%dsquery.exe%'
  OR LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%nltest.exe%'
  OR (LOWER("Command") LIKE '%whoami%' AND (LOWER("Command") LIKE '%/groups%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%/all%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%/priv%'))
  OR (
    (LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%powershell.exe%' OR LOWER("Process Name") LIKE '%pwsh.exe%') AND (
      LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-localuser%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-localgroup%' OR
      LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-aduser%' OR LOWER("Command") LIKE '%get-adgroupmember%' OR
      LOWER("Command") LIKE '%directorysearcher%'
    )
  )
)
LAST 24 HOURS
ORDER BY starttime DESC
medium severity high confidence

Detects Windows account discovery activity in IBM QRadar by correlating process name and command line arguments from Sysmon and Windows Security event sources. Computes a per-event discovery score to prioritize high-fidelity alerts. Maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1087.

Data Sources

Windows Security Events via WinCollect (Event ID 4688)Sysmon via WinCollect (Event ID 1)Microsoft Windows Event Log DSM

Required Tables

events

False Positives & Tuning

  • IT administrators using net.exe or PowerShell AD cmdlets for routine account management, inventory, or compliance reporting
  • Help desk personnel querying AD group membership to resolve access requests or troubleshoot login failures
  • Automated lifecycle management scripts that enumerate accounts during provisioning or deprovisioning workflows
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1087

Microsoft Sentinel (KQL) Splunk (SPL) Elastic Security (Elastic) Sumo Logic CSE (Sumo) Google Chronicle (YARA-L) CrowdStrike LogScale (LogScale) All platforms (combined) →

Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Local Account Enumeration via Net User

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Windows\System32\net.exe and CommandLine='net user'. Net1.exe may also appear as a child process. Security Event ID 4688 (if command line auditing enabled) with the same detail. No network connections expected — local SAM database query only.

  2. Test 2Domain Account and Group Enumeration via Net

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Three sequential Process Create events for net.exe with CommandLines 'net user /domain', 'net group Domain Admins /domain', 'net group Enterprise Admins /domain'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connections to domain controller IP on port 445 (SMB/SAMR protocol for domain queries). Security Event IDs 4661/4662 on the domain controller for directory object access.

  3. Test 3Active Directory Enumeration via PowerShell Get-ADUser

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=powershell.exe and CommandLine containing 'Get-ADUser' and '-Filter *'. Sysmon Event ID 3: LDAP connection (port 389 or 3268 for global catalog) from powershell.exe to domain controller IP. PowerShell ScriptBlock Logging Event ID 4104 with full script content. Domain Controller Security Event IDs 4661/4662 for directory service access.

  4. Test 4WMI-Based Local Account Enumeration

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIC.exe and CommandLine='wmic useraccount list brief'. Possible WMI provider process creation (WmiPrvSE.exe). No network connections for local query. Security Event ID 4688 with command line if auditing enabled.

  5. Test 5dsquery Domain User Enumeration

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=C:\Windows\System32\dsquery.exe and CommandLine='dsquery user -limit 0'. Sysmon Event ID 3: LDAP connection from dsquery.exe to domain controller on port 389 or 3268. Security Event IDs 4661/4662 on domain controller for directory access.

Last updated: 2026-04-17 Research depth: deep
References (11)

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Related Detections

Sub-techniques (4)

Related Techniques

T1087.001Local AccountT1087.002Domain AccountT1087.003Email AccountT1087.004Cloud AccountT1069Permission Groups DiscoveryT1069.001Local GroupsT1069.002Domain GroupsT1033System Owner/User DiscoveryT1078Valid AccountsT1110Brute ForceT1566PhishingT1021Remote ServicesT1136Create Account

Same Tactic: Discovery

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