Detect Cloud Accounts in Sumo Logic CSE
Valid cloud accounts may be leveraged by adversaries to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion in cloud environments. Adversaries may obtain cloud credentials through phishing, brute force, credential theft from endpoints, or by compromising on-premises identity infrastructure federated with cloud services. Once in possession of valid credentials, adversaries can authenticate to cloud management planes (Azure, AWS, GCP), SaaS applications (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace), or identity providers (Entra ID, Okta) and operate as legitimate users. Techniques include abusing service principals, managed identities, OAuth tokens, and API keys to maintain persistence and move laterally across cloud resources.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- Sub-technique
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory=azure/aad/signin
| json "properties.status.errorCode" as error_code nodrop
| json "properties.userPrincipalName" as user nodrop
| json "properties.ipAddress" as src_ip nodrop
| json "properties.clientAppUsed" as client_app nodrop
| json "properties.location.countryOrRegion" as country nodrop
| json "properties.riskLevelDuringSignIn" as risk_level nodrop
| json "properties.authenticationRequirement" as auth_req nodrop
| json "properties.conditionalAccessStatus" as ca_status nodrop
| json "properties.appDisplayName" as app_name nodrop
| json "properties.userAgent" as user_agent nodrop
| where error_code = "0"
| where country in ("KP","IR","RU","CN","BY")
OR client_app matches /(?i)(imap|pop3|smtp|basicauth|exchange.?activesync|autodiscover|exchange.?web.?services|authenticated.?smtp|outlook.?anywhere)/
OR risk_level in ("high","medium")
OR (auth_req = "singleFactorAuthentication" AND ca_status != "notApplied")
| if(country in ("KP","IR","RU","CN","BY"), "SuspiciousCountry", "") as flag_country
| if(client_app matches /(?i)(imap|pop3|smtp|basicauth|exchange.?activesync)/, "LegacyAuth", "") as flag_legacy
| if(risk_level in ("high","medium"), concat("HighRisk:",risk_level), "") as flag_risk
| if(auth_req = "singleFactorAuthentication" AND ca_status != "notApplied", "MFABypassed", "") as flag_mfa
| concat(flag_country, " ", flag_legacy, " ", flag_risk, " ", flag_mfa) as risk_factors
| fields _messageTime, user, src_ip, app_name, country, client_app, risk_level, auth_req, ca_status, risk_factors
| sort by _messageTime descSumo Logic query that parses raw Azure AD sign-in JSON logs forwarded via Azure Diagnostics Settings or Azure Event Hub. Extracts risk indicator fields directly from the nested properties JSON structure using the json operator with nodrop to handle missing fields gracefully. Applies individual boolean risk flags and builds a composite risk_factors label per event for analyst triage. Adjust the _sourceCategory value to match your environment's Azure AD log source category configuration.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- B2B partner or vendor accounts from organizations physically headquartered in Russia, China, or Iran that are legitimate business relationships with approved access
- Penetration testing accounts intentionally authenticating through country-specific VPN endpoints during a scheduled and documented security assessment
- Cloud-native service accounts not yet migrated to certificate-based or managed identity authentication that use approved legacy protocols for compatibility with older integrations
Other platforms for T1078.004
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Azure CLI Authentication with Compromised Credentials
Expected signal: Entra ID SigninLogs: successful interactive sign-in with AppDisplayName='Microsoft Azure CLI', DeviceDetail showing unregistered device, IPAddress of test machine. AuditLogs may show directory read operations. Risk signals may trigger if this is a new location or device for the account.
- Test 2Service Principal Authentication and Enumeration
Expected signal: AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs: service principal authentication event with IPAddress, ResourceDisplayName, and AppId. AuditLogs: directory read operations. If run from a new IP, this will appear as an anomalous source for the service principal.
- Test 3Legacy Authentication Simulation via SMTP Basic Auth
Expected signal: Entra ID SigninLogs: sign-in attempt with ClientAppUsed='Authenticated SMTP' or 'SMTP Auth', Protocol='SMTP', IsInteractive=false. The sign-in will be flagged as legacy authentication. If successful, ResultType=0; if legacy auth is blocked by CA policy, ResultType will reflect the block.
- Test 4Impossible Travel Simulation via Azure Resource Manager API
Expected signal: Two sign-in events in SigninLogs from different IP addresses and geolocations for the same account within a short time window. Entra ID Identity Protection may generate an 'Impossible travel' or 'Unfamiliar sign-in properties' risk detection (AADUserRiskEvents). The second sign-in will have a different CountryOrRegion in LocationDetails.
- Test 5Add Credentials to Existing Service Principal (Persistence)
Expected signal: AuditLogs: OperationName='Add service principal credentials' or 'Update application – Certificates and secrets management' with the initiating user's UPN, source IP, and target service principal name and ID. This is the exact pattern hunted by the Service Principal Credential Addition hunting query.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/overview-identity-protection
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/21/advice-for-incident-responders-on-recovery-from-systemic-identity-compromises/
- https://posts.specterops.io/managed-identity-attack-paths-part-1-automation-accounts-82667d17187a
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-microsoft-365
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/detect-threats-built-in
- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/ROADtools
- https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/block-legacy-authentication
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/howto-create-service-principal-portal
- https://microsoft.github.io/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/
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