Detect Cloud Accounts in Elastic Security
Valid cloud accounts may be leveraged by adversaries to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion in cloud environments. Adversaries may obtain cloud credentials through phishing, brute force, credential theft from endpoints, or by compromising on-premises identity infrastructure federated with cloud services. Once in possession of valid credentials, adversaries can authenticate to cloud management planes (Azure, AWS, GCP), SaaS applications (Microsoft 365, Google Workspace), or identity providers (Entra ID, Okta) and operate as legitimate users. Techniques include abusing service principals, managed identities, OAuth tokens, and API keys to maintain persistence and move laterally across cloud resources.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Technique
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- Sub-technique
- T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
Elastic Detection Query
any where event.dataset == "azure.signinlogs"
and azure.signinlogs.properties.status.error_code == "0"
and (
azure.signinlogs.properties.location.country_or_region in ("KP", "IR", "RU", "CN", "BY") or
azure.signinlogs.properties.client_app_used like~ ("*IMAP*", "*POP3*", "*SMTP*", "*BasicAuth*", "*ExchangeActiveSync*", "*AutoDiscover*", "*Exchange Web Services*", "*Authenticated SMTP*", "*Outlook Anywhere*") or
azure.signinlogs.properties.risk_level_during_sign_in in ("high", "medium") or
(
azure.signinlogs.properties.authentication_requirement == "singleFactorAuthentication" and
azure.signinlogs.properties.conditional_access_status != "notApplied"
)
)Detects suspicious Azure AD cloud account sign-ins using Elastic's Azure integration dataset. Identifies successful authentications meeting one or more risk indicators: login from high-risk countries (KP/IR/RU/CN/BY), legacy authentication protocol usage (IMAP/POP3/SMTP/BasicAuth/EAS), medium or high Azure Identity Protection risk level, or single-factor authentication where a conditional access policy was in scope. Field paths correspond to the Elastic Azure integration's flattened representation of Azure Monitor JSON diagnostic logs.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate users traveling to or working in Russia, China, or other flagged countries accessing corporate resources via authorized VPN or from a local ISP
- Approved legacy applications (monitoring tools, printers, old email clients) using Basic Auth or SMTP AUTH that are on an exemption list during an OAuth migration window
- Microsoft Identity Protection false positives elevating risk scores for users authenticating from new devices, fresh browser profiles, or unfamiliar but legitimate corporate networks
Other platforms for T1078.004
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Azure CLI Authentication with Compromised Credentials
Expected signal: Entra ID SigninLogs: successful interactive sign-in with AppDisplayName='Microsoft Azure CLI', DeviceDetail showing unregistered device, IPAddress of test machine. AuditLogs may show directory read operations. Risk signals may trigger if this is a new location or device for the account.
- Test 2Service Principal Authentication and Enumeration
Expected signal: AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs: service principal authentication event with IPAddress, ResourceDisplayName, and AppId. AuditLogs: directory read operations. If run from a new IP, this will appear as an anomalous source for the service principal.
- Test 3Legacy Authentication Simulation via SMTP Basic Auth
Expected signal: Entra ID SigninLogs: sign-in attempt with ClientAppUsed='Authenticated SMTP' or 'SMTP Auth', Protocol='SMTP', IsInteractive=false. The sign-in will be flagged as legacy authentication. If successful, ResultType=0; if legacy auth is blocked by CA policy, ResultType will reflect the block.
- Test 4Impossible Travel Simulation via Azure Resource Manager API
Expected signal: Two sign-in events in SigninLogs from different IP addresses and geolocations for the same account within a short time window. Entra ID Identity Protection may generate an 'Impossible travel' or 'Unfamiliar sign-in properties' risk detection (AADUserRiskEvents). The second sign-in will have a different CountryOrRegion in LocationDetails.
- Test 5Add Credentials to Existing Service Principal (Persistence)
Expected signal: AuditLogs: OperationName='Add service principal credentials' or 'Update application – Certificates and secrets management' with the initiating user's UPN, source IP, and target service principal name and ID. This is the exact pattern hunted by the Service Principal Credential Addition hunting query.
References (12)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/concept-sign-ins
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/overview-identity-protection
- https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/21/advice-for-incident-responders-on-recovery-from-systemic-identity-compromises/
- https://posts.specterops.io/managed-identity-attack-paths-part-1-automation-accounts-82667d17187a
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-microsoft-365
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/sentinel/detect-threats-built-in
- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/ROADtools
- https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/conditional-access/block-legacy-authentication
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/howto-create-service-principal-portal
- https://microsoft.github.io/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1078.004 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.