Detect Local Data Staging in Microsoft Sentinel
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through archiving techniques. Adversaries commonly use temp directories, hidden folders, or application data paths to aggregate stolen files, credentials, screenshots, keylogger output, and memory dumps before transferring them out. Interactive command shells (cmd.exe, bash) and scripting languages are frequently used to copy and consolidate data into staging locations.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1074 Data Staged
- Sub-technique
- T1074.001 Local Data Staging
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001/
KQL Detection Query
let StagingPaths = dynamic([
"\\Temp\\", "\\tmp\\", "\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\",
"\\AppData\\Roaming\\", "\\ProgramData\\",
"\\Windows\\Temp\\", "\\Users\\Public\\",
"\\Recycle", "\\$Recycle.Bin"
]);
let StagingExtensions = dynamic([
".zip", ".rar", ".7z", ".tar", ".gz",
".tmp", ".dat", ".db", ".bak"
]);
let StagingTools = dynamic([
"xcopy", "robocopy", "copy", "move",
"compress", "compact", "tar", "7z",
"rar", "zip"
]);
// Detection 1: Bulk file copy operations into staging paths
let BulkFileCopy = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where (
(FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and
ProcessCommandLine has_any (StagingTools) and
ProcessCommandLine has_any (StagingPaths))
or
(FileName in~ ("xcopy.exe", "robocopy.exe") and
ProcessCommandLine has_any (StagingPaths))
)
| extend StagingIndicator = "BulkFileCopy";
// Detection 2: Suspicious file creation in staging paths
let SuspiciousFileCreation = DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FolderPath has_any (StagingPaths)
| where FileName has_any (StagingExtensions)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsMpEng.exe", "svchost.exe", "TiWorker.exe",
"WindowsUpdate", "wuauclt.exe", "msiexec.exe",
"OneDrive.exe", "Teams.exe", "Slack.exe")
| extend StagingIndicator = "SuspiciousFileCreation";
// Detection 3: Redirect operators appending output to files in staging dirs
let OutputRedirect = DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(24h)
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "bash", "sh")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(>>|>\s*[""']?)(.*)(\\Temp\\|\\tmp\\|\\ProgramData\\|\\Users\\Public\\)"
| extend StagingIndicator = "OutputRedirect";
union BulkFileCopy, SuspiciousFileCreation, OutputRedirect
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
StagingIndicator
| sort by Timestamp descDetects local data staging activity using Microsoft Defender for Endpoint tables. Combines three signals: (1) bulk file copy tools (xcopy, robocopy, cmd/PowerShell copy commands) targeting staging directories; (2) archive or data file creation in temp/public/appdata paths by suspicious initiating processes; (3) shell output redirection (>>) writing to staging directories. Covers common staging paths including Temp, ProgramData, and Users\Public.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Backup software or IT tools (Acronis, Veeam, Windows Backup) writing archives to temp directories during scheduled backup jobs
- Software installers and update mechanisms that extract files to %TEMP% or %ProgramData% as part of legitimate installation workflows
- Log aggregation or diagnostic tools that consolidate logs into temp folders for upload to centralized logging systems
- Developer workflows where build systems (MSBuild, CMake, npm) create temporary archives or data files in project directories
Other platforms for T1074.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Stage Files to Temp Directory Using CMD Copy
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for cmd.exe with CommandLine containing 'copy' and '%TEMP%\staging_test'. Sysmon Event ID 11: Multiple FileCreate events in the staging directory. Security Event ID 4688 (if command-line auditing enabled) showing the copy commands.
- Test 2Stage Collected Output Using Append Redirect Operator
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Multiple Process Create events for cmd.exe with CommandLine containing '>>' and the staging file path in %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate/FileModify events for collected_data.tmp. The file grows with each command execution.
- Test 3Stage Files with Hostname-Username Naming Convention
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine referencing %COMPUTERNAME%_%USERNAME%.txt. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate event in %TEMP% with filename matching Hostname_Username.txt pattern. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full script content.
- Test 4Stage Data in Windows Registry (DarkWatchman Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe. Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryValueSet): Registry value CachedData set under HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Notepad with large Base64-encoded data. DeviceRegistryEvents: RegistryValueSet event visible in MDE.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oopsie-oilrig-uses-threedollars-deliver-new-trojan/
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2021/12/sidecopy-apt-connecting-lures-to-victims-payloads-to-infrastructure
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/roadsweep-ransomware-zerocleare-wiper
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day
- https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
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