Detect Local Data Staging in Elastic Security
Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory on the local system prior to exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through archiving techniques. Adversaries commonly use temp directories, hidden folders, or application data paths to aggregate stolen files, credentials, screenshots, keylogger output, and memory dumps before transferring them out. Interactive command shells (cmd.exe, bash) and scripting languages are frequently used to copy and consolidate data into staging locations.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Collection
- Technique
- T1074 Data Staged
- Sub-technique
- T1074.001 Local Data Staging
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001/
Elastic Detection Query
sequence by host.id with maxspan=5m
[process where event.type == "start" and
(
(process.name in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and
process.args : ("*xcopy*", "*robocopy*", "*copy*", "*move*", "*compress*", "*tar*", "*7z*", "*rar*", "*zip*") and
process.args : ("*\\Temp\\*", "*\\tmp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*", "*\\ProgramData\\*", "*\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\Users\\Public\\*"))
or
(process.name in~ ("xcopy.exe", "robocopy.exe") and
process.args : ("*\\Temp\\*", "*\\tmp\\*", "*\\ProgramData\\*", "*\\Users\\Public\\*"))
or
(process.name in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "bash", "sh") and
process.command_line : ("*>>*", "*> *") and
process.command_line : ("*\\Temp\\*", "*\\tmp\\*", "*\\ProgramData\\*", "*\\Users\\Public\\*"))
) and
not process.parent.name in~ ("MsMpEng.exe", "svchost.exe", "TiWorker.exe", "wuauclt.exe", "msiexec.exe")]
[file where event.type == "creation" and
file.path : ("*\\Temp\\*", "*\\tmp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*", "*\\AppData\\Roaming\\*", "*\\ProgramData\\*", "*\\Windows\\Temp\\*", "*\\Users\\Public\\*") and
file.extension in~ ("zip", "rar", "7z", "tar", "gz", "tmp", "dat", "db", "bak") and
not process.name in~ ("MsMpEng.exe", "svchost.exe", "TiWorker.exe", "wuauclt.exe", "msiexec.exe", "OneDrive.exe", "Teams.exe", "Slack.exe")]Detects T1074.001 Local Data Staging by correlating process execution of bulk copy/archive tools targeting staging paths with subsequent archive or temp file creation in those same paths. Uses ECS fields across process and file event types in a sequence correlation.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Software installers and update agents (Windows Update, SCCM, Chocolatey) routinely extract archives and copy files into %TEMP% and %ProgramData% as part of normal installation workflows
- Backup and sync tools such as Acronis, Veeam, OneDrive, and Dropbox frequently copy and archive files to staging directories before uploading or snapshotting
- Developer toolchains (MSBuild, npm, cargo, pip) produce intermediate build artifacts and package archives in temp directories during compilation and dependency resolution
Other platforms for T1074.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Stage Files to Temp Directory Using CMD Copy
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for cmd.exe with CommandLine containing 'copy' and '%TEMP%\staging_test'. Sysmon Event ID 11: Multiple FileCreate events in the staging directory. Security Event ID 4688 (if command-line auditing enabled) showing the copy commands.
- Test 2Stage Collected Output Using Append Redirect Operator
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Multiple Process Create events for cmd.exe with CommandLine containing '>>' and the staging file path in %TEMP%. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate/FileModify events for collected_data.tmp. The file grows with each command execution.
- Test 3Stage Files with Hostname-Username Naming Convention
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine referencing %COMPUTERNAME%_%USERNAME%.txt. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate event in %TEMP% with filename matching Hostname_Username.txt pattern. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full script content.
- Test 4Stage Data in Windows Registry (DarkWatchman Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe. Sysmon Event ID 13 (RegistryValueSet): Registry value CachedData set under HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Notepad with large Base64-encoded data. DeviceRegistryEvents: RegistryValueSet event visible in MDE.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/001/
- https://web.archive.org/web/20220629230035/https://www.prevailion.com/darkwatchman-new-fileless-techniques/
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-oopsie-oilrig-uses-threedollars-deliver-new-trojan/
- https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2021/12/sidecopy-apt-connecting-lures-to-victims-payloads-to-infrastructure
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/roadsweep-ransomware-zerocleare-wiper
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day
- https://securelist.com/my-name-is-dtrack/93338/
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md
- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/tree/master/rules/windows/file/file_event
- https://www.secureworks.com/research/bronze-union
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0027/
- https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
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