T1070.008 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Clear Mailbox Data in Elastic Security

Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Adversaries may use Exchange PowerShell cmdlets (e.g., Remove-MailboxExportRequest, Search-Mailbox with DeleteContent), O365/Graph API calls, or command-line mail utilities on Linux/macOS to delete emails, purge Deleted Items, remove sent items, wipe transport rules, or remove export request logs. This covers tracks from phishing delivery, internal spearphishing, email-based C2, and email exfiltration.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Defense Evasion
Technique
T1070 Indicator Removal
Sub-technique
T1070.008 Clear Mailbox Data
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/008/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5m
  [process where event.type == "start"
    and process.name in~ ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
    and (
      process.args : "*Remove-MailboxExportRequest*"
      or process.args : "*Remove-MailboxImportRequest*"
      or process.args : "*Search-Mailbox*"
      or process.args : "*Remove-TransportRule*"
      or process.args : "*Disable-TransportRule*"
      or process.args : "*New-TransportRule*"
      or process.args : "*Remove-InboxRule*"
      or process.args : "*Set-InboxRule*"
      or process.args : "*New-InboxRule*"
      or process.args : "*New-ComplianceSearchAction*"
      or process.args : "*Remove-MoveRequest*"
      or process.args : "*Remove-RecoverableItemsCleanup*"
      or process.args : "*Set-MailboxMessageConfiguration*"
    )
  ] by process.entity_id
high severity high confidence

Detects Exchange PowerShell cmdlets used to delete or cover mailbox activity evidence, including Remove-MailboxExportRequest, Search-Mailbox -DeleteContent, transport rule manipulation, and inbox rule abuse. Matches T1070.008 adversary tradecraft for wiping phishing delivery, C2, or exfiltration evidence from Exchange/O365.

Data Sources

Windows Security Event Log (4688)Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create)Elastic Endpoint agent process telemetry

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.process-*logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*winlogbeat-*

False Positives & Tuning

  • Exchange administrators running scheduled mailbox export cleanup scripts as part of routine housekeeping (Remove-MailboxExportRequest after completed exports)
  • Compliance or legal hold operations using New-ComplianceSearchAction and Search-Mailbox with -DeleteContent to fulfill eDiscovery deletion orders
  • Mail flow engineers modifying or removing transport rules during approved change windows for routing reconfiguration
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1070.008


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Remove Mailbox Export Request via Exchange PowerShell

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Remove-MailboxExportRequest'. Office 365 Unified Audit Log: RecordType=ExchangeAdmin, Operation=New-MailboxExportRequest followed by Remove-MailboxExportRequest from same UserId. Exchange Admin Audit Log entries for both operations. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log (Event ID 4104) with full cmdlet invocation.

  2. Test 2Search-Mailbox with DeleteContent to Purge Emails

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Search-Mailbox' and '-DeleteContent'. Windows Security Event ID 4688 (if enabled) with same details. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log (Event ID 4104) capturing full cmdlet with all parameters. Exchange Admin Audit Log entry with full command details.

  3. Test 3Create Suppression Transport Rule to Delete Security Notifications

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'New-TransportRule' and 'DeleteMessage'. Office 365 Unified Audit Log / Exchange Admin Audit Log: RecordType=ExchangeAdmin, Operation=New-TransportRule with full rule parameters. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log (Event ID 4104) with complete rule definition including -DeleteMessage flag.

  4. Test 4Delete Emails via Linux mail Command

    Expected signal: Linux auditd: execve syscall for 'mail' binary with arguments containing 'd' (delete) flag. Syslog: process invocation of /usr/bin/mail or /bin/mail. If Sysmon for Linux is deployed: ProcessCreate event with Image=/usr/bin/mail and CommandLine containing delete arguments.

  5. Test 5Remove Inbox Rule to Cover Tracks After Rule-Based Exfiltration

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Remove-InboxRule'. Exchange Admin Audit Log and O365 Unified Audit Log: Operations New-InboxRule then Remove-InboxRule from same account. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log (Event ID 4104) capturing both rule creation and removal. If alerting on New-InboxRule, the forwarding rule creation would also trigger separately.

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