T1070.005 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Network Share Connection Removal in Elastic Security

Adversaries remove Windows network share connections after use to clean up traces of lateral movement and data access. Network shares mapped via net use or UNC paths leave artifacts in the Windows registry (HKCU\Network), Windows event logs (Event ID 5140 — network share object accessed, Event ID 5142 — network share created), and in the MRU list. The primary utility for removal is net use \\target\share /delete or net use * /DELETE /Y to remove all mapped drives simultaneously. RobbinHood ransomware used net use * /DELETE /Y to disconnect all network shares before encryption, likely to ensure local encryption of any mapped network paths. Threat Group-3390 detached network shares after exfiltrating files. InvisiMole, DUSTTRAP (APT41), and various ransomware families routinely perform share cleanup as a post-exploitation step.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Defense Evasion
Technique
T1070 Indicator Removal
Sub-technique
T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/005/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5m
  [process where event.type == "start"
    and process.name in ("net.exe", "net1.exe")
    and process.args : "use"
    and process.args : ("/delete", "/DELETE", "/d", "*")
  ] by process.pid
| [any where true] by process.parent.pid

// Alternative flat query for broader coverage:
process where event.type == "start"
  and process.name in ("net.exe", "net1.exe")
  and process.command_line : "*use*"
  and (
    process.command_line : "*/delete*"
    or process.command_line : "*/DELETE*"
    or process.command_line : "* /d *"
    or (process.command_line : "* * *" and process.command_line : "*use*")
  )
high severity high confidence

Detects network share connection removal via net.exe or net1.exe with /delete flag or wildcard to remove all shares. Covers both targeted share deletion and bulk removal (net use * /DELETE /Y) as used by RobbinHood ransomware and APT groups for lateral movement cleanup.

Data Sources

Elastic Endpoint SecurityWinlogbeat with SysmonAuditbeat

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.process-*winlogbeat-*.ds-logs-endpoint*

False Positives & Tuning

  • IT administrators running scheduled scripts to clean up stale drive mappings at logoff via Group Policy logoff scripts
  • End users manually disconnecting network shares through Windows Explorer or command line after completing legitimate file transfers
  • Automated provisioning or imaging tools that map and unmap shares during software deployment or OS refresh workflows
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1070.005


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Remove Specific Network Share Connection with net use /delete

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode 1: net.exe process creation with 'use \\127.0.0.1\IPC$ /delete' command line. Windows Security Event ID 5140 (share accessed) and then no corresponding 5142 (share removed) since the share never fully established due to authentication. MDE DeviceProcessEvents captures both the mapping and deletion commands.

  2. Test 2Bulk Network Share Removal with net use * /DELETE

    Expected signal: Sysmon EventCode 1: net.exe with '* /DELETE /Y' in command line. Windows Security Event ID 5140 may fire for each share that was disconnected. The wildcard (*) in the command line is a high-fidelity indicator of bulk share removal. MDE DeviceProcessEvents captures the full command including the * wildcard.

  3. Test 3Delete Network Share Registry History (MountPoints2 Cleanup)

    Expected signal: reg.exe process creation with 'delete' and 'MountPoints2' in command line. Sysmon EventCode 12 (RegistryKeyDeleted) for HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2. Security Event ID 4657 if registry auditing is enabled for HKCU keys.

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