T1069 Google Chronicle · YARA-L

Detect Permission Groups Discovery in Google Chronicle

Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings to understand which user accounts and groups are available, group memberships, and which users and groups have elevated permissions. This information informs targeting decisions and enables privilege escalation, lateral movement, and persistence planning. Common enumeration methods include native Windows commands (net group, net localgroup), PowerShell cmdlets (Get-ADGroup, Get-LocalGroup), LDAP queries, BloodHound/SharpHound collection, Linux identity commands (id, groups, getent group), and cloud-provider APIs. Threat actors including APT41, TA505, Volt Typhoon, and Scattered Spider have used these techniques in real-world intrusions.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Discovery
Technique
T1069 Permission Groups Discovery
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/

YARA-L Detection Query

Google Chronicle (YARA-L)
yaral
rule mitre_t1069_permission_groups_discovery {
  meta:
    author = "Argus Detection Engineering"
    description = "Detects MITRE ATT&CK T1069 Permission Groups Discovery via net.exe group enumeration, PowerShell AD/local group cmdlets, dsquery/dsget, whoami with group flags, gpresult, and BloodHound/SharpHound collectors"
    mitre_attack_tactic = "Discovery"
    mitre_attack_technique = "T1069"
    mitre_attack_url = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/"
    severity = "MEDIUM"
    confidence = "HIGH"
    version = "1.0"
    created = "2026-04-18"

  events:
    $e.metadata.event_type = "PROCESS_LAUNCH"
    $e.principal.hostname = $hostname
    $e.principal.user.userid = $user
    $e.target.process.command_line = $cmdline
    $e.target.process.file.full_path = $proc_path

    (
      // net.exe / net1.exe group enumeration
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)net1?\.exe$`)
        and (
          re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)\bgroup\b`)
          or re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)\blocalgroup\b`)
        )
      )
      or
      // PowerShell AD/local group cmdlets
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)(powershell|pwsh)\.exe$`)
        and re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(Get-ADGroup|Get-ADGroupMember|Get-LocalGroup|Get-LocalGroupMember|Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership)`)
      )
      or
      // dsquery / dsget LDAP group queries
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)(dsquery|dsget)\.exe$`)
        and re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)\bgroup\b`)
      )
      or
      // whoami with group/privilege flags
      (
        re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)whoami\.exe$`)
        and re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(/groups|/all|/priv)`)
      )
      or
      // gpresult — Group Policy result showing group memberships
      re.regex($e.target.process.file.full_path, `(?i)(\\|/)gpresult\.exe$`)
      or
      // BloodHound / SharpHound collection
      re.regex($e.target.process.command_line, `(?i)(SharpHound|BloodHound|-CollectionMethod|--CollectionMethods)`)
    )

  condition:
    $e
}
medium severity high confidence

Google Chronicle YARA-L 2.0 rule detecting MITRE T1069 Permission Groups Discovery. Monitors PROCESS_LAUNCH UDM events for group enumeration via net.exe/net1.exe, PowerShell AD and local group cmdlets (Get-ADGroup, Get-LocalGroup families), dsquery/dsget LDAP group queries, whoami with /groups /all /priv flags, gpresult execution, and BloodHound/SharpHound collector invocations. Designed for the Chronicle UDM normalized event model.

Data Sources

Google Chronicle SIEMChronicle Forwarder with Sysmon/Windows SecurityChronicle UDM normalized process events

Required Tables

UDM events (PROCESS_LAUNCH type)

False Positives & Tuning

  • IT administrators using Get-ADGroup or net group commands from privileged admin workstations during routine identity lifecycle management tasks
  • Group Policy troubleshooting workflows where helpdesk runs gpresult /r or whoami /groups to diagnose policy application failures
  • Authorized red team operators or internal penetration testers running BloodHound/SharpHound under a defined rules-of-engagement scope
  • Configuration management and deployment automation tools querying group membership to validate role-based access control configuration
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1069


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 5 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Local Group Enumeration via net.exe

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events for net.exe (or net1.exe, which net.exe spawns internally). CommandLine values: 'net localgroup' and 'net localgroup Administrators'. Security Event ID 4688 if command line auditing is enabled. Parent process will be cmd.exe or the shell used to execute the commands.

  2. Test 2Domain Group Enumeration via net.exe

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for net.exe with CommandLine 'net group /domain' and 'net group "Domain Admins" /domain'. Network connection to domain controller on port 389 (LDAP) or 445 (SMB SAMR protocol). On the domain controller: Security Event ID 4661/4662 may fire for SAM group object access.

  3. Test 3PowerShell Active Directory Group Enumeration

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for powershell.exe with CommandLine containing 'Get-ADGroup' and 'Get-ADGroupMember'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 capturing the full script content. LDAP network traffic to domain controller on port 389/636.

  4. Test 4whoami Group Membership Query

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Two Process Create events for whoami.exe. CommandLine values: 'whoami /groups' and 'whoami /all'. No network traffic (local token query). Output includes SID values, group names, and enabled privileges — this data is often captured via screen scraping in interactive sessions.

  5. Test 5Linux Group Discovery via id and getent

    Expected signal: Linux auditd: syscall execve events for /usr/bin/id, /usr/bin/groups, /usr/bin/getent with respective arguments. Syslog entries if exec auditing is enabled. On systems with osquery or EDR agents: process creation events for each command with full argument lists.

Unlock Pro Content

Get the full detection package for T1069 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.

Response PlaybookInvestigation GuideHunting QueriesAtomic Red Team TestsTuning Guidance

Related Detections