Detect Cloud Groups in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings to understand role assignments, privilege levels, and group memberships within a cloud environment. Tools such as Get-MsolRole (Office 365), az ad user get-member-groups (Azure CLI), ROADTools, AADInternals, and Pacu are used to enumerate cloud identity groups. In AWS, ListRolePolicies and ListAttachedRolePolicies enumerate role policies. Adversaries use this information to identify privileged accounts, determine lateral movement paths, and select targets for privilege escalation.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Discovery
- Technique
- T1069 Permission Groups Discovery
- Sub-technique
- T1069.003 Cloud Groups
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003/
Sumo Detection Query
(_sourceCategory=*o365* OR _sourceCategory=*azure/audit* OR _sourceCategory=*windows/sysmon* OR _sourceCategory=*windows/security*)
| where (Operation in ("List group members", "List groups", "Get group",
"List directory roles", "List directory role members",
"List role assignments", "Get role assignment",
"Member.Read.All", "Group.Read.All"))
OR (CommandLine matches "*Get-MsolRole*"
OR CommandLine matches "*Get-MsolRoleMember*"
OR CommandLine matches "*Get-AzureADGroup*"
OR CommandLine matches "*Get-AzureADGroupMember*"
OR CommandLine matches "*Get-AzureADDirectoryRole*"
OR CommandLine matches "*Get-MgGroup*"
OR CommandLine matches "*Get-MgDirectoryRole*"
OR CommandLine matches "*az ad group*"
OR CommandLine matches "*az role assignment list*"
OR CommandLine matches "*az ad user get-member-groups*"
OR CommandLine matches "*ListRolePolicies*"
OR CommandLine matches "*ListAttachedRolePolicies*"
OR CommandLine matches "*Get-AzRoleAssignment*"
OR CommandLine matches "*Get-AzADGroup*"
OR CommandLine matches "*roadrecon*"
OR CommandLine matches "*aadinternals*"
OR CommandLine matches "*invoke-aadintrecon*"
OR CommandLine matches "*azurehound*"
OR CommandLine matches "*stormspotter*"
OR CommandLine matches "*pacu*")
| if (!isNull(UserId), UserId, if (!isNull(User), User, "unknown")) as actor
| if (!isNull(ClientIP), ClientIP, if (!isNull(src_ip), src_ip, "endpoint")) as source_ip
| if (!isNull(Operation), Operation, CommandLine) as action
| if (!isNull(ApplicationId), ApplicationId, if (!isNull(Image), Image, "unknown")) as app
| timeslice 5m
| count as ops by actor, source_ip, app, action, _timeslice
| sum(ops) as TotalOps, count_distinct(action) as UniqueOps by actor, source_ip, app, _timeslice
| where TotalOps > 10 OR UniqueOps > 3
| fields _timeslice, actor, source_ip, app, TotalOps, UniqueOps
| sort by TotalOpsDetects sustained cloud group enumeration (T1069.003) in Sumo Logic by ingesting both O365/Azure AD audit events and Windows endpoint logs. Applies the same volume thresholds as the SPL query (TotalOps > 10 or UniqueOps > 3 within a 5-minute window) to surface rapid or bulk enumeration patterns. Field normalization via if/isNull coalesces actor, source IP, and app identities across both log types. Requires source categories to be configured for O365 Management Activity, Azure AD Audit, and Windows Sysmon or Security logs.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Scheduled IAM governance or compliance reports that bulk-enumerate Azure AD group memberships and role assignments using dedicated service account credentials
- Cloud security posture management (CSPM) or CIEM tools performing continuous assessment of role assignments, which may trigger volume thresholds
- DevOps pipeline service principals using az CLI to validate role assignments before deploying infrastructure, generating multiple sequential read operations
Other platforms for T1069.003
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Enumerate Azure AD Groups via MSOnline PowerShell Module
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process creation with CommandLine containing 'Get-MsolRole' and 'Get-MsolRoleMember'. PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104 with full script content. Azure AD Audit Logs: 'List directory roles' and 'List directory role members' operations attributed to the authenticated user. Sysmon Event ID 3: Outbound network connections to login.microsoftonline.com and graph.windows.net.
- Test 2Enumerate Azure AD Groups via Azure CLI
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: az.cmd process creation with CommandLine containing 'ad group list', 'ad user get-member-groups', 'role assignment list'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network connections to management.azure.com and graph.microsoft.com. Azure AD Audit Logs: 'List groups', 'List role assignments' operations. File creation events (Sysmon ID 11) for output files in TEMP directory.
- Test 3Enumerate AWS IAM Role Policies via AWS CLI
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell and aws.exe process creation events with CommandLine containing 'list-roles', 'list-role-policies', 'list-attached-role-policies', 'list-groups'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Outbound connections to iam.amazonaws.com (port 443). File creation events for output files. AWS CloudTrail: ListRoles, ListRolePolicies, ListAttachedRolePolicies, ListGroups API calls attributed to the IAM principal.
- Test 4Enumerate Azure AD Groups using Microsoft Graph PowerShell SDK
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: PowerShell process with CommandLine containing 'Get-MgGroup', 'Get-MgDirectoryRole', 'Get-MgDirectoryRoleMember'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Outbound connections to graph.microsoft.com (port 443). PowerShell ScriptBlock Log Event ID 4104. Azure AD Audit Logs: 'List groups', 'List directory roles', 'List directory role members' operations. Sysmon Event ID 11: CSV file creation in TEMP directory.
References (13)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003/
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/msonline/get-msolrole?view=azureadps-1.0
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/ad/user?view=azure-cli-latest
- https://cloud.google.com/identity/docs/reference/rest
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_GetBucketAcl.html
- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/compromised-cloud-compute-credentials/
- https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teaming-microsoft-part-1-active-directory-leaks-via-azure/
- https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools
- https://o365blog.com/post/aadinternals/
- https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu
- https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/AzureHound
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/reports-monitoring/concept-audit-logs
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/graph/api/group-list-members
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