Detect Masquerade Account Name in Elastic Security
Adversaries may match or approximate the names of legitimate accounts to make newly created ones appear benign. This will typically occur during Create Account, although accounts may also be renamed at a later date. This may also coincide with Account Access Removal if the actor first deletes an account before re-creating one with the same name. Often, adversaries will attempt to masquerade as service accounts, such as those associated with legitimate software, data backups, or container cluster management. They may also give accounts generic, trustworthy names, such as 'admin', 'help', or 'root.' Sometimes adversaries may model account names off of those already existing in the system, as a follow-on behavior to Account Discovery.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Defense Evasion
- Technique
- T1036 Masquerading
- Sub-technique
- T1036.010 Masquerade Account Name
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/010/
Elastic Detection Query
iam where event.code == "4720" and (
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName in~ ("admin", "administrator", "help", "helpdesk", "helpassistant", "support", "supportaccount", "svc_backup", "svc_sql", "svc_update", "backup", "backupadmin", "defaultaccount", "default", "root", "service", "system", "sysadmin", "dbadmin", "sqladmin", "guest", "test", "temp", "maintenance", "monitoring") or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "svc_*" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "svc-*" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "admin*" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "service*" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "backup*" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "help*" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "support*" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "default*" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "sys*" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "*admin" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "*service" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "*backup" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "*help" or
winlog.event_data.TargetUserName like~ "*support"
)Detects creation of Windows local accounts with names masquerading as built-in system accounts, service accounts, or administrative accounts via Windows Security Event ID 4720. Uses case-insensitive list-membership and wildcard matching against known suspicious account name values, common service account prefixes (svc_, service, backup, admin), and administrative naming suffixes. Requires Elastic 8.6+ for in~ and like~ operators.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Enterprise backup software (Veeam, Commvault, Acronis) automatically creating service accounts named 'svc_backup' or 'backupadmin' during installation or initial configuration on Windows servers
- Database platform installers (Microsoft SQL Server, MySQL, PostgreSQL) that create dedicated service accounts matching 'svc_sql', 'dbadmin', or 'sqladmin' patterns as part of automated first-run setup routines
- Helpdesk or ITSM platforms (ServiceNow on-prem agents, Zendesk) that provision dedicated support or helpdesk accounts matching monitored naming patterns during standard IT onboarding workflows
Other platforms for T1036.010
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Create Masquerade Service Account (Windows)
Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 4720: User Account Created with TargetUserName='svc_backup'. Event ID 4722: Account Enabled. Event ID 4738: Account attributes changed (comment field set). Process creation event for net.exe with 'user svc_backup /add' in command line.
- Test 2Create Masquerade HelpAssistant Account (Flame Pattern)
Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 4720: User Account Created with TargetUserName='HelpAssistant'. Event ID 4732: Member Added to Local Group ('Remote Desktop Users'). Process creation events for net.exe with both user creation and group addition commands.
- Test 3Delete and Recreate Account (MOVEit Pattern)
Expected signal: Windows Security Event ID 4720: First account creation. Event ID 4726: Account deletion. Event ID 4720: Second account creation with same name. The time delta between deletion (4726) and recreation (4720) will be approximately 2 seconds, well within the 60-minute hunting window.
References (7)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/010/
- https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/cuba-ransomware-campaign-analysis
- https://www.invictus-ir.com/news/ransomware-in-the-cloud
- https://www.huntress.com/blog/moveit-transfer-critical-vulnerability-rapid-response
- https://blog.aquasec.com/leveraging-kubernetes-rbac-to-backdoor-clusters
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4720
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md
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