Detect Remote Desktop Protocol in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). RDP is a common feature in Windows that allows interactive graphical sessions on remote systems. Threat actors including Kimsuky, INC Ransom, Volt Typhoon, Wizard Spider, BlackByte, Akira, and FIN7 have all leveraged RDP for lateral movement. Adversaries typically acquire credentials via Credential Access techniques, then use RDP to expand access to additional systems, deploy ransomware interactively, or establish persistence via Accessibility Features.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Lateral Movement
- Technique
- T1021 Remote Services
- Sub-technique
- T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
Sumo Detection Query
_sourceCategory=windows/security (EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4625) Logon_Type=10
| parse regex "Source Network Address:\s+(?<SourceIP>[^\r\n]+)" nodrop
| parse regex "Account Name:\s+(?<Account>[^\r\n]+)" as TargetAccount nodrop
| parse regex "Workstation Name:\s+(?<SourceHost>[^\r\n]+)" nodrop
| where SourceIP != "127.0.0.1"
AND SourceIP != "::1"
AND SourceIP != "-"
AND SourceIP != ""
AND !isNull(SourceIP)
| eval EventType = if(EventCode == "4624", "RDP_Success", "RDP_Failure")
| eval TargetHost = if(!isNull(Computer), Computer, host)
| eval SensitiveHost = if(matches(toLowerCase(TargetHost), ".*?(dc|pdc|dc01|domain.controller|exchange|sql).*"), 1, 0)
| eval PrivAccount = if(matches(toLowerCase(TargetAccount), ".*?(admin|administrator|svc_|service).*"), 1, 0)
| timeslice 5m
| stats count as EventCount,
values(EventType) as EventTypes,
values(TargetAccount) as Accounts,
dcount(TargetAccount) as UniqueAccounts,
values(TargetHost) as TargetHosts,
max(SensitiveHost) as HitSensitiveHost,
max(PrivAccount) as PrivAccountUsed
by _timeslice, SourceIP
| where EventCount >= 3 OR HitSensitiveHost = 1 OR PrivAccountUsed = 1
| eval RiskScore = EventCount + (HitSensitiveHost * 10) + (PrivAccountUsed * 5) + (UniqueAccounts * 2)
| fields _timeslice, SourceIP, EventCount, EventTypes, Accounts, UniqueAccounts, TargetHosts, HitSensitiveHost, PrivAccountUsed, RiskScore
| sort by RiskScore descDetects T1021.001 RDP lateral movement in Sumo Logic by parsing Windows Security Event Log entries for EventCode 4624 (success) and 4625 (failure) with Logon_Type=10 (RemoteInteractive/RDP). Aggregates events per source IP per 5-minute timeslice. Alerts when 3+ events occur from a single source, or when any event targets a sensitive host (DC/PDC/SQL/Exchange) or uses a privileged/service account. Calculates a composite risk score for analyst triage prioritisation.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Automated configuration management tools (Ansible, SCCM) that use service accounts to RDP into managed systems during maintenance windows.
- Remote workforce VPN users connecting to virtual desktops via RDP with accounts containing 'admin' naming conventions inherited from legacy policy.
- Security operations staff using privileged admin workstations (PAWs) to RDP into servers as part of documented incident response procedures.
Other platforms for T1021.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1RDP Connection to Remote Host
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mstsc.exe, CommandLine='/v:127.0.0.1 /admin'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection to port 3389. Security Event ID 4624 (LogonType=10) on the target if RDP is enabled. Event ID 1149 in TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager log.
- Test 2Enable RDP and Create RDP-Accessible User
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 (Registry Value Set) for HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\fDenyTSConnections. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) for net.exe with 'Remote Desktop Users' in command line. Security Event ID 4732 (member added to security-enabled local group). Security Event ID 4657 (registry value modified).
- Test 3Simulate RDP Brute Force (Authentication Failures)
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4625 (Logon Failure, LogonType=10) for each failed attempt. Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational Event ID 261. After 6 failures, detection threshold should fire.
- Test 4RDP Tunnel via NetSH Port Proxy
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for netsh.exe with 'portproxy' and 'add' in command line. Registry change at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy. Security Event ID 4688 for netsh.exe. Sysmon Event ID 12/13 for registry modification.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-securityevent-table
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin12-ransomware-intrusion-actor-partnering-trickbot
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a
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