Detect Remote Desktop Protocol in IBM QRadar
Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). RDP is a common feature in Windows that allows interactive graphical sessions on remote systems. Threat actors including Kimsuky, INC Ransom, Volt Typhoon, Wizard Spider, BlackByte, Akira, and FIN7 have all leveraged RDP for lateral movement. Adversaries typically acquire credentials via Credential Access techniques, then use RDP to expand access to additional systems, deploy ransomware interactively, or establish persistence via Accessibility Features.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Lateral Movement
- Technique
- T1021 Remote Services
- Sub-technique
- T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
QRadar Detection Query
-- Brute force: 5+ RDP failures per source IP per 5-minute window
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm', 'UTC') AS EventWindow,
sourceip AS SourceIP,
destinationip AS TargetHost,
username AS Account,
COUNT(*) AS FailureCount,
MIN(DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss', 'UTC')) AS FirstSeen,
MAX(DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss', 'UTC')) AS LastSeen
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPEID = 12
AND QIDNAME(qid) LIKE '%4625%'
AND CATEGORYNAME(category) = 'Authentication'
AND sourceip IS NOT NULL
AND sourceip NOT LIKE '127.%'
AND sourceip != '::1'
AND sourceip != '-'
AND "Logon Type" = '10'
GROUP BY
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm', 'UTC'),
sourceip,
destinationip,
username
HAVING FailureCount >= 5
LAST 1440 MINUTES
ORDER BY FailureCount DESC
UNION
-- Successful RDP to sensitive hosts or by privileged accounts
SELECT
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss', 'UTC') AS EventWindow,
sourceip AS SourceIP,
destinationip AS TargetHost,
username AS Account,
1 AS FailureCount,
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss', 'UTC') AS FirstSeen,
DATEFORMAT(starttime, 'YYYY-MM-dd HH:mm:ss', 'UTC') AS LastSeen
FROM events
WHERE LOGSOURCETYPEID = 12
AND QIDNAME(qid) LIKE '%4624%'
AND CATEGORYNAME(category) = 'Authentication'
AND sourceip IS NOT NULL
AND sourceip NOT LIKE '127.%'
AND sourceip != '::1'
AND "Logon Type" = '10'
AND (
LOWER(destinationhostname) MATCHES '(.*dc.*|.*pdc.*|.*dc01.*|.*domain.controller.*)'
OR LOWER(username) MATCHES '(.*admin.*|.*administrator.*|.*svc_.*|.*service.*)'
)
LAST 1440 MINUTES
ORDER BY FirstSeen DESCDetects T1021.001 RDP lateral movement in IBM QRadar via two AQL queries unioned: (1) RDP authentication failures (EventID 4625, LogonType 10) aggregated by source IP per 5-minute window with 5+ failure threshold indicating brute force; (2) successful RDP logons (EventID 4624, LogonType 10) targeting sensitive hosts matching DC/PDC patterns or using accounts matching admin/service naming conventions. Requires a custom QRadar property 'Logon Type' mapped from Windows Security event field.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Legitimate jump-box or bastion host administrators who RDP into domain controllers as part of standard change management procedures.
- IT helpdesk staff using accounts with 'admin' in the username prefix when remotely accessing end-user workstations for support.
- Vulnerability scanners or asset management tools that perform authenticated RDP checks against multiple hosts, generating repeated logon events.
Other platforms for T1021.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 4 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1RDP Connection to Remote Host
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=mstsc.exe, CommandLine='/v:127.0.0.1 /admin'. Sysmon Event ID 3: Network Connection to port 3389. Security Event ID 4624 (LogonType=10) on the target if RDP is enabled. Event ID 1149 in TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager log.
- Test 2Enable RDP and Create RDP-Accessible User
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 13 (Registry Value Set) for HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\fDenyTSConnections. Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Create) for net.exe with 'Remote Desktop Users' in command line. Security Event ID 4732 (member added to security-enabled local group). Security Event ID 4657 (registry value modified).
- Test 3Simulate RDP Brute Force (Authentication Failures)
Expected signal: Security Event ID 4625 (Logon Failure, LogonType=10) for each failed attempt. Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational Event ID 261. After 6 failures, detection threshold should fire.
- Test 4RDP Tunnel via NetSH Port Proxy
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for netsh.exe with 'portproxy' and 'add' in command line. Registry change at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\PortProxy. Security Event ID 4688 for netsh.exe. Sysmon Event ID 12/13 for registry modification.
References (8)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/
- https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsserver/ee236407.aspx
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/advanced-hunting-securityevent-table
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin12-ransomware-intrusion-actor-partnering-trickbot
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa24-038a
Unlock Pro Content
Get the full detection package for T1021.001 including response playbook, investigation guide, and atomic red team tests.