Detect LSA Secrets in CrowdStrike LogScale
Adversaries with SYSTEM access dump LSA secrets from HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets, which contain service account credentials, auto-logon passwords, IIS application pool credentials, scheduled task credentials, and VPN/dial-up credentials. Tools include Mimikatz (lsadump::secrets), Impacket secretsdump.py, gsecdump, LaZagne, and reg.exe to export HKLM\SECURITY. Used by MuddyWater, APT33, APT29, OilRig, Ember Bear, Leafminer, and many others. Service account credentials from LSA secrets enable lateral movement to the services those accounts manage.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- Sub-technique
- T1003.004 LSA Secrets
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004/
LogScale Detection Query
#event_simpleName = /^(RegGenericKeyEvent|ProcessRollup2)$/
| case {
test(#event_simpleName = "RegGenericKeyEvent") |
RegistryPath = /SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets/i |
not ImageFileName = /(lsass\.exe|svchost\.exe|services\.exe)$/i |
DetectionType := "RegistryAccess" ;
test(#event_simpleName = "ProcessRollup2" and CommandLine = /(lsadump::secrets|lsadump::cache|secretsdump|lsa_secrets|LSAsecret)/i) |
DetectionType := "DumpTool" ;
test(#event_simpleName = "ProcessRollup2" and ImageFileName = /reg\.exe$/i and CommandLine = /save/i and CommandLine = /security/i) |
not CommandLine = /hklm\\\\system/i |
DetectionType := "RegExport" ;
* | drop()
}
| groupBy([ComputerName, UserName, ImageFileName, CommandLine, RegistryPath, DetectionType], function=count(as=EventCount))
| sort(field=_time, order=desc, limit=500)Detects LSA Secrets dumping (T1003.004) in CrowdStrike LogScale using Falcon Data Replicator events. Correlates RegGenericKeyEvent events targeting SECURITY\Policy\Secrets from non-system processes, ProcessRollup2 events with known dump tool command line patterns (Mimikatz lsadump::secrets, Impacket secretsdump), and reg.exe ProcessRollup2 events with SECURITY hive save operations. Uses CrowdStrike's native #event_simpleName taxonomy.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- CrowdStrike Falcon sensor itself performing internal telemetry collection that generates RegGenericKeyEvent entries referencing SECURITY registry paths during its own process access monitoring
- Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Intune management agents executing reg.exe commands to export registry hives for compliance baseline comparisons or configuration inventory collection
- Penetration testing engagements where authorized red team operators use secretsdump.py or Mimikatz under a sanctioned Rules of Engagement — these should be time-bounded and correlated with change tickets
Other platforms for T1003.004
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Export SECURITY Registry Hive
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for reg.exe with CommandLine 'save HKLM\SECURITY'. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for atomic_security.hiv. Sysmon Event ID 12/13: Registry access to HKLM\SECURITY by reg.exe.
- Test 2Mimikatz LSA Secrets Dump Command
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for mimikatz.exe with 'lsadump::secrets' in CommandLine. Sysmon Event ID 12/13: Registry access to SECURITY\Policy\Secrets if Mimikatz reads from registry. Security Event ID 4688 for mimikatz.exe process creation.
- Test 3LaZagne Credential Dump (LSA Secrets Module)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for lazagne.exe with '-lsa' parameter. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess targeting lsass.exe if LaZagne attempts in-memory extraction. Security Event ID 4688 for lazagne.exe. Windows Defender may flag as HackTool.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004/
- https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23
- https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets
- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.004/T1003.004.md
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