Detect LSA Secrets in Elastic Security
Adversaries with SYSTEM access dump LSA secrets from HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets, which contain service account credentials, auto-logon passwords, IIS application pool credentials, scheduled task credentials, and VPN/dial-up credentials. Tools include Mimikatz (lsadump::secrets), Impacket secretsdump.py, gsecdump, LaZagne, and reg.exe to export HKLM\SECURITY. Used by MuddyWater, APT33, APT29, OilRig, Ember Bear, Leafminer, and many others. Service account credentials from LSA secrets enable lateral movement to the services those accounts manage.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- Sub-technique
- T1003.004 LSA Secrets
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004/
Elastic Detection Query
any where
(
event.category == "registry" and
registry.path : ("*\\SECURITY\\Policy\\Secrets*") and
not process.name : ("lsass.exe", "svchost.exe", "services.exe", "LSASS.EXE")
) or
(
event.category == "process" and event.type == "start" and
process.command_line : ("*lsadump::secrets*", "*lsadump::cache*", "*secretsdump*", "*lsa_secrets*", "*LSAsecret*")
) or
(
event.category == "process" and event.type == "start" and
process.name : "reg.exe" and
process.command_line : "*save*" and
process.command_line : "*security*" and
not process.command_line : "*system*"
)Detects LSA Secrets dumping (T1003.004) via three patterns: direct registry access to HKLM\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets by non-system processes, process command lines invoking known dump tools (Mimikatz lsadump::secrets, Impacket secretsdump), and reg.exe save commands targeting the SECURITY hive for offline extraction.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Backup software or configuration management tools (e.g., Ansible, SCCM) that legitimately enumerate LSA secrets for auditing purposes under controlled change windows
- Security scanning tools such as CyberArk PTA, BeyondTrust, or Tenable.SC enumerating credential stores as part of privileged access management audits
- Legitimate IT operations using reg.exe to export the SECURITY hive as part of GPO troubleshooting or disaster recovery procedures — typically performed by domain admins during maintenance windows
Other platforms for T1003.004
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Export SECURITY Registry Hive
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for reg.exe with CommandLine 'save HKLM\SECURITY'. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for atomic_security.hiv. Sysmon Event ID 12/13: Registry access to HKLM\SECURITY by reg.exe.
- Test 2Mimikatz LSA Secrets Dump Command
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for mimikatz.exe with 'lsadump::secrets' in CommandLine. Sysmon Event ID 12/13: Registry access to SECURITY\Policy\Secrets if Mimikatz reads from registry. Security Event ID 4688 for mimikatz.exe process creation.
- Test 3LaZagne Credential Dump (LSA Secrets Module)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for lazagne.exe with '-lsa' parameter. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess targeting lsass.exe if LaZagne attempts in-memory extraction. Security Event ID 4688 for lazagne.exe. Windows Defender may flag as HackTool.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/004/
- https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=23
- https://ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-lsa-secrets
- https://www.first.org/resources/papers/conf2017/Windows-Credentials-Attacks-and-Mitigation-Techniques.pdf
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.004/T1003.004.md
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