Detect Security Account Manager in Splunk
Adversaries attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database containing local account NTLM hashes. The SAM requires SYSTEM-level access. Methods include: registry export (reg save HKLM\sam; reg save HKLM\system), Volume Shadow Copy access, Mimikatz lsadump::sam, secretsdump.py, gsecdump, pwdump, and creddump7. Used by APT29, APT41, Daggerfly, GALLIUM, Wizard Spider, Ember Bear, Agrius, and ransomware operators universally. Combined with the SYSTEM hive, SAM allows offline hash extraction.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- Sub-technique
- T1003.002 Security Account Manager
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
SPL Detection Query
index=wineventlog sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode=1
| eval IsSAMDump=case(
match(lower(Image), "reg\.exe") AND match(lower(CommandLine), "save.*(hklm\\sam|hklm\\system|hklm\\security)"), 1,
match(lower(CommandLine), "lsadump::sam|lsadump::cache|sekurlsa::msv"), 1,
match(lower(Image), "vssadmin\.exe") AND match(lower(CommandLine), "create shadow|list shadow"), 1,
match(lower(Image), "(esentutl|ntdsutil)\.exe") AND match(lower(CommandLine), "(sam|ntds|shadow)"), 1,
1==1, 0
)
| where IsSAMDump=1
| eval DumpMethod=case(
match(lower(Image), "reg\.exe"), "RegistryExport",
match(lower(CommandLine), "lsadump|sekurlsa"), "Mimikatz",
match(lower(Image), "vssadmin"), "ShadowCopy",
match(lower(Image), "esentutl|ntdsutil"), "ESENTool",
1==1, "Other"
)
| table _time, host, Image, CommandLine, User, DumpMethod
| sort - _timeDetects SAM credential dumping using Sysmon Event ID 1. Identifies reg.exe saving SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY hives, Mimikatz lsadump module commands, vssadmin shadow copy creation, and esentutl/ntdsutil accessing SAM-related paths. DumpMethod field categorizes the technique used.
Data Sources
Required Sourcetypes
False Positives & Tuning
- Enterprise backup solutions running vssadmin as part of scheduled backup operations
- System state backups by IT operations team with documented change tickets
- Forensic tools used by IR teams during authorized investigations
- Configuration management systems performing pre-change system state captures
Other platforms for T1003.002
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1Export SAM and SYSTEM Registry Hives
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=reg.exe, CommandLine containing 'save HKLM\sam'. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for atomic_sam.hiv and atomic_system.hiv. Security Event ID 4688 for reg.exe process creation.
- Test 2SAM Dump via Mimikatz lsadump::sam (Command Pattern)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine containing 'lsadump::sam'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess if Mimikatz attempts to access lsass.exe. Security Event ID 4688 for mimikatz.exe. Windows Defender may flag this as HackTool:Win32/Mimikatz.
- Test 3Create Volume Shadow Copy for SAM Access
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for vssadmin.exe with CommandLine 'create shadow /for=C:'. System Event Log: Event ID 8193/8194 for Volume Shadow Copy service events. Security Event ID 4688 for vssadmin.exe.
References (5)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/
- https://github.com/Neohapsis/creddump7
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md
- https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dumping-hashes-from-sam-registry
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/audit-sam
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