T1003.002 Elastic Security · Elastic

Detect Security Account Manager in Elastic Security

Adversaries attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database containing local account NTLM hashes. The SAM requires SYSTEM-level access. Methods include: registry export (reg save HKLM\sam; reg save HKLM\system), Volume Shadow Copy access, Mimikatz lsadump::sam, secretsdump.py, gsecdump, pwdump, and creddump7. Used by APT29, APT41, Daggerfly, GALLIUM, Wizard Spider, Ember Bear, Agrius, and ransomware operators universally. Combined with the SYSTEM hive, SAM allows offline hash extraction.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tactic
Credential Access
Technique
T1003 OS Credential Dumping
Sub-technique
T1003.002 Security Account Manager
Canonical reference
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/002/

Elastic Detection Query

Elastic Security (Elastic)
eql
sequence by host.name with maxspan=5m
  [process where event.type == "start" and
   (
     (process.name : "reg.exe" and process.args : ("save", "hklm\\sam", "hklm\\system", "hklm\\security")) or
     (process.name : ("esentutl.exe", "ntdsutil.exe") and process.args : ("sam", "ntds", "shadow")) or
     (process.command_line : ("*lsadump::sam*", "*lsadump::cache*", "*sekurlsa::msv*")) or
     (process.name : "vssadmin.exe" and process.args : ("create", "shadow", "list"))
   )
  ] by process.entity_id
critical severity high confidence

Detects SAM database credential dumping via registry export, shadow copy access, Mimikatz commands, or VSS enumeration using Elastic EQL sequence correlation on process telemetry.

Data Sources

Elastic Endpoint SecurityWinlogbeat with SysmonElastic Agent (endpoint integration)

Required Tables

logs-endpoint.events.process-*winlogbeat-*

False Positives & Tuning

  • Legitimate system administrators using reg.exe to back up registry hives for disaster recovery purposes
  • Authorized backup software (e.g., Windows Server Backup, Veeam) accessing VSS shadows as part of scheduled backup jobs
  • IT security teams running authorized Mimikatz or credential audit tools during sanctioned penetration tests or vulnerability assessments
Download portable Sigma rule (.yml)

Other platforms for T1003.002


Testing Methodology

Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.

  1. Test 1Export SAM and SYSTEM Registry Hives

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with Image=reg.exe, CommandLine containing 'save HKLM\sam'. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for atomic_sam.hiv and atomic_system.hiv. Security Event ID 4688 for reg.exe process creation.

  2. Test 2SAM Dump via Mimikatz lsadump::sam (Command Pattern)

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create with CommandLine containing 'lsadump::sam'. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess if Mimikatz attempts to access lsass.exe. Security Event ID 4688 for mimikatz.exe. Windows Defender may flag this as HackTool:Win32/Mimikatz.

  3. Test 3Create Volume Shadow Copy for SAM Access

    Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for vssadmin.exe with CommandLine 'create shadow /for=C:'. System Event Log: Event ID 8193/8194 for Volume Shadow Copy service events. Security Event ID 4688 for vssadmin.exe.

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