Detect LSASS Memory in Sumo Logic CSE
Adversaries access credential material stored in the LSASS process memory. After logon, Windows stores credentials (NTLM hashes, Kerberos tickets, plaintext passwords via WDigest) in LSASS. Tools used include Mimikatz, ProcDump, comsvcs.dll MiniDump (rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump), WerFault silent process exit, and Cobalt Strike's sekurlsa module. Used extensively by APT1, APT33, OilRig, HAFNIUM, Volt Typhoon, NotPetya, Cobalt Strike operators, and many others. Highest-frequency credential dumping technique observed in the wild.
MITRE ATT&CK
- Tactic
- Credential Access
- Technique
- T1003 OS Credential Dumping
- Sub-technique
- T1003.001 LSASS Memory
- Canonical reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
Sumo Detection Query
/* LSASS Credential Dumping — T1003.001 */
(_sourceCategory="windows/sysmon" OR _sourceCategory="os/windows/sysmon")
| parse xml
| where EventID in ("1", "10")
| if (EventID="10",
TargetImage,
"") as lsass_target
| if (EventID="10",
SourceImage,
Image) as exec_image
| if (EventID="10",
GrantedAccess,
"") as access_mask
| if (EventID="10",
SourceCommandLine,
CommandLine) as cmdline
| if (EventID="10",
SourceUser,
User) as actor_user
| where (
/* EID 10: Direct LSASS access with suspicious mask */
(EventID = "10"
AND lsass_target matches "(?i).*lsass\.exe$"
AND !exec_image matches "(?i).*(MsMpEng|csrss|services|lsm|svchost|winlogon|wininit|SecurityHealthService|SenseIR)\.exe$"
AND access_mask in ("0x1fffff", "0x1f3fff", "0x143a", "0x1410", "0x1010", "0x40")
)
OR
/* EID 1: comsvcs MiniDump via rundll32 */
(EventID = "1"
AND exec_image matches "(?i).*rundll32\.exe$"
AND cmdline matches "(?i).*comsvcs.*MiniDump.*"
)
OR
/* EID 1: ProcDump targeting lsass */
(EventID = "1"
AND exec_image matches "(?i).*procdump(64)?\.exe$"
AND cmdline matches "(?i).*lsass.*"
)
)
| eval detection_type = if(EventID="10", "DirectLsassAccess",
if(cmdline matches "(?i).*comsvcs.*", "ComsvcsMinidump", "ProcDumpLsass"))
| fields _messageTime, Computer, exec_image, cmdline, actor_user, access_mask, detection_type
| sort by _messageTime descDetects LSASS memory credential dumping in Sumo Logic by parsing Sysmon XML events. Covers EID 10 (process access to lsass.exe with elevated access masks), EID 1 for rundll32/comsvcs MiniDump technique, and EID 1 for ProcDump against LSASS. Classifies each hit by detection type for analyst triage.
Data Sources
Required Tables
False Positives & Tuning
- Windows Defender and other AV products may legitimately access LSASS for real-time protection scanning — validate against known AV process names not in the exclusion list
- Legitimate crash dump collection by Windows Error Reporting (WerFault.exe) when LSASS itself crashes — correlate with system stability events and WER configuration
- Authorized red team or penetration testing exercises — verify change tickets or authorized testing windows before escalating
Other platforms for T1003.001
Testing Methodology
Validate this detection against 3 adversary techniques from Atomic Red Team. Each test below lists the behaviour to exercise and the telemetry you should expect to see. Executable commands and cleanup steps are available with Pro.
- Test 1LSASS Dump via comsvcs.dll MiniDump (LOLBin)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for rundll32.exe with CommandLine containing comsvcs.dll MiniDump. Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess for lsass.exe from rundll32.exe with GrantedAccess=0x1fffff. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for the .dmp file in C:\Windows\Temp\.
- Test 2LSASS Access via PowerShell Reflection (Mimikatz-Style)
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess with TargetImage=lsass.exe, SourceImage=powershell.exe. The GrantedAccess value depends on the access requested by Get-Process. Security Event ID 4656/4663 if process object auditing is enabled.
- Test 3LSASS Dump via ProcDump
Expected signal: Sysmon Event ID 10: ProcessAccess with TargetImage=lsass.exe, SourceImage=procdump.exe, GrantedAccess=0x1fffff. Sysmon Event ID 11: FileCreate for lsass_pd_test.dmp. Sysmon Event ID 1: Process Create for procdump.exe with lsass.exe in CommandLine.
References (7)
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/
- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-attempts-to-steal-passwords-from-memory-558f16dce4ea
- https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/
- https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/lsass-memory-dumps-are-stealthier-than-ever-before-part-2
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection
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